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These essays contribute to the literature on Macroeconomics. Chapter 1 provides an en-
dogenous growth model to explain the impact of financial reform on a nation’s growth rate
both in the short run and the long run. The current literature focuses only on the transition
period right after the reform and therefore, cannot match the long-run growth rate that is
higher than the pre-reform growth rate. The model primarily operates through a borrowing
constraint on firms that prevents them from optimally allocating resources between capital
investment and innovation. Through this mechanism, it can explain all three phases of a
country’s growth around a financial reform: A very low growth period before the reform,
rapid growth immediately following the reform, and finally a convergence to a moderate
growth rate in the long run.
Chapter 2 develops a monopolistic competition model with multi-sector network linkages.
In the presence of monopolistic competition, information of firm size is not sufficient infor-
mation to measure an individual firm’s impact on the economy. Therefore, the interaction
between firms should be considered to measure the impact properly.
Chapter 3 inspects the impact of input-output linkages on gains from trade. I extend the
model from Chapter 2 to an open economy. The conventional issue in the current literature
is that the welfare gain from trade is too small. The model is different from existing mod-
els with input-output linkages in that it cannot only compare welfare gains with standard
ii
models, but also enables a counter-factual analysis to examine the importance of network
linkages by shutting down the relationship across sectors within the country. In the model,
opening trade delivers newly introduced goods to a firm in the country. These newly traded
goods will be used to produce other goods in a more efficient way. Through this channel,
measured gains from trade are bigger than in the standard literature. The input-output
linkages initiate a positive chain reaction through the economy and produce an additional
channel for welfare gain that is absent in standard models, thereby increasing measured
welfare gain.
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CHAPTER 1
Finance, Misallocation and Growth: Quantifying the
Contribution of Financial Market Imperfections and
Reforms to East Asian Growth Miracles
1.1 Introduction
Starting from Schumpeter (1911)’s argument that a sound financial system improves a na-
tion’s wealth, the importance of the financial system has been widely emphasized in many
countries’ economic policies as well as the academic literature. Schumpeter argues a well
developed banking system promotes innovation activity and induces economic growth. This
paper develops a model that can help us understand the connection between finance and
innovation through the lens of the interplay between investment in innovation and inefficient
allocation of resources due to capital market imperfection. In addition, we match the historic
features of Asian countries’ rapid growth after financial reforms - 1) extremely high growth
immediately following reforms, 2) persistent high growth for several decades, 3) very high
investment to output ratios, and 4) finally and most importantly, higher steady state growth
rate than pre-reform steady state growth rate after settling down.
We develop an endogenous growth model to study the impact of financial market imper-
fections on economic growth through capital misallocation. Previous research on misalloca-
tion mainly focuses on the level of output, but often fails to emphasize the long run growth
effect of the misallocation. Papers such as Mino (2015) and Laeven et al. (2015) study the
long run growth effect of the capital market imperfection, but don’t explore transitional dy-
namics. In contrast, our model can capture the full picture of financial reform on economic
1
growth. Following Buera and Shin (2013) and Moll (2014), we introduce collateral constraint
as a form of capital market imperfection. Capital serves not only as an input, but also as
collateral to facilitate access to funds for production. This collateral constraint results in
over-accumulation of capital, which deters the economy from investing in innovation. Finally,
the imbalance between capital and human capital as accumulative assets lowers aggregate
efficiency thereby lowering economic growth.
Our model can capture the salient features of the Asian miracle after financial reform. The
outstanding postwar growth of Asian countries has attracted many researchers’ attention.
Young (1995) and Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997) argue that capital and human capital
accumulation are the main causes of the rapid growth. On the other hand, Easterly and
Levine (2001) point out the overestimation problem in their work and attribute the increase
in total factor productivity (TFP) to the rapid growth. To reconcile these two opposing
views, my model focuses on the role of financial constraints. When firms are financially
constrained, the more efficient firms don’t always have access to capital lowering aggregate
TFP and holding down investment in human capital. When the constraints are lifted, TFP
and investment in physical and human capital increase simultaneously.
Building on the early contributions of the two pioneering papers discussed above, there is
a large literature studying the Asian growth miracle. Prescott and Parente (1994), Pack and
Nelson (1997), Song et al. (2011) and Buera and Shin (2013) are notable theoretical papers
that explain the extraordinary growth of Asian countries. They study the cause of increase
in total factor productivity through various channels (e.g finance, trade, and technology
barrier). On the empirical side, Stiglitz and Yusuf (2001), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)
and Lo´pez (2005) summarize the potential cause and dynamics of the East Asian miracle.
This strand of literature mainly focuses on the rapid and persistent growth of Asian
countries during the miracle itself, but is comparatively silent regarding the post-miracle
trends. Figure 1.1 describes the pattern of the so-called Asian miracle after the reforms.
These countries’ average annual growth rates of GDP per capita were around zero in 1950s.
In the beginning of 1960s, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan all conducted enormous
2
financial reforms that spurred the growth rates up to 7%.1. They experienced persistent
rapid growth through the 1970s and 1980s, but the growth rates have been decelerating
thereafter. Eventually, the growth rate of GDP per capita converges from 2% to 3% , which
is higher than the pre-reform growth rate of 0%. This motivates us to develop an endogenous
growth model to exhibit a permanent-growth effect from financial reforms.
Financial reform is closely related to misallocation because when there are capital market
imperfections, resources are not efficiently allocated to their best uses - the more efficient
firms cannot use as much capital as they want. Recent work has actively studied the relation-
ship between misallocation and aggregate inefficiency. Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia
and Rogerson (2008) and Midrigan and Xu (2014) explain how resource misallocation can
affect aggregate total factor productivity. Buera and Shin (2013) and Moll (2014) study
the impact of financial reform in both the short-term and the long-term. These papers,
however, only focus on the level of output. Therefore, they cannot comment on the effects
of financial reform on the long-run growth rate, which motivates the use of an edogenous
growth framework to fill this gap.
There is also a notable endogenous growth literature with capital market imperfection.
Early contributions include Boyd and Prescott (1986), Newman and Banerjee (1993), King
and Levine (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997). They assume a representative agent model
to study the impact of financial frictions on the long-run growth rate, which is limited in
performing richer analyses of misallocation. Jones (2011), Mino (2015), Laeven et al. (2015),
and Anzoategui et al. (2019) are recent papers that utilize the heterogeneous agent setup.
All of them provide excellent insights into the contribution of financial reform to a nation’s
long-run growth rate. We contribute to this literature by developing a tractable model with
the transitional dynamics that they currently miss. The study of transitional dynamics
is crucial in understanding the entire feature of the Asian Miracle, both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
In section 2, we develop an endogenous growth model with collateral constraints. In
1Details of 1960’s financial reforms are described in the Appendix
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Figure 1.1: Annual average growth rate of Asian countries
section 3, we will study the long-run effect of financial reform. Finally, in section 4, we will
see transitional dynamics to match the salient features of Asian miracle.
1.2 The Model
We construct a continuous time endogenous growth model to study the role of financial
market imperfection in economic growth. The economy grows as firms invest in physical
and human capital. We can think of these two kinds of investment as differing in a few
important ways. First, there will be a market for physical capital while human capital will
be specific to each firm. Second, investment in physical capital gives a guaranteed return
while investment in human capital is risky. Finally, we will introduce a borrowing constraint
that depends on a firm’s current stock of physical capital - they can only borrow up to a
percentage of their currently owned assets. This last assumption generates a situation where
firms need to overinvest in physical capital in order to avoid hitting their constraint, which
will imply a lower growth rate than in an unconstrained model.
4
1.2.1 Simple explanation of the model mechanism
The model is closely related to Buera and Shin (2013) and Moll (2014) by using a collateral
constraint as the primary market imperfection. These models, as with most papers that
study misalloacation take the following aggregate production form:
T (ψ)KαL1−α. (1.1)
In this model, T (ψ) is the total factor productivity representing the economy’s aggregate
efficiency, K the aggregate capital, and L the aggregate labor. Suppose ψ is the degree of
misallocation caused by capital market imperfection. In this case, GDP per capita at the
steady state depends only on ψ. Severe misallocation (High ψ) results in low aggregate
productivity (low T ), and vice versa. With this form, reallocating resources from inefficient
firms to more efficient ones will result in static gains. However, undoing the misallocation
would not have a permanent effect on growth rates on its own. To address this concern, we
take an approach with an AK structure, which will result in a different long-run GDP per
capita growth rate. The reduced form of our model in this case looks like:
T (ψ)K. (1.2)
Following Romer (1990), the growth rate at the steady state is T (ψ) − ρ where ρ is a
discount rate. As a result, the capital market imperfection indirectly affects the long run
growth rate through misallocation. To generate misallocation, we assume each individual
producer has a production function of the form
Azαk1−α. (1.3)
A is the productivity level, which is identical across agents and z represents human capi-
tal that can be accumulated only through investment in innovation. This production still
satisfies AK structure because both capital and human capital are accumulative assets. Col-
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lateral constraints will motivate agents to accumulate excess physical capital, which diverts
resources from innovation and lowers aggregate inefficiency.
1.2.2 Preference and Technology
There are a continuum of entrepreneurs with preferences given by
E0
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log ct dt (1.4)
where ρ is a discount rate. Each agent is endowed with their own productivity (z) and wealth
(a). Combining their productivity and physical capital k they produce output according to
Azαt k
1−α
t . (1.5)
A represents total factor productivity which is identical across agent. α is human capital
share. (1-α) is capital share.2
1.2.3 Collateral constraint and budget constraint
Physical capital is the only tradable asset in this economy. Entrepreneurs can rent (lend)
physical capital k − a (a − k) from the capital market at a interest rate rt. However, they
are restricted in borrowing capital according to the following constraint.
kt ≤ µat (1.6)
The collateral constraint parameter is denoted by µ ≥ 1. µ = 1 implies financial autarky
- firms can only use capital they already own. In contrast, µ = ∞ means a friction-less
economy where firms have no limits on borrowing. After production, entrepreneurs make
2We can generalize the model to incorporate labor where each agent can use L units of his own la-
bor. In this case, we can rewrite down the production function with labor-augmenting human capital
(A(zL)αk1−α) = (A˜(z)αk1−α) where A˜ = ALα
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a decision to distribute their output along three margins - consumption, c, investment in
physical asset, a˙ and investment in innovation, x. Therefore, the budget constraint follows
a˙t = Az
α
t k
1−α
t − rt(kt − at)︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit
−ct − xt (1.7)
In words, Equation (1.7) says that the change in total assets is profit (production minus cost
of borrowing) minus consumption and investment in innovation.
The production decision is a purely static problem. Therefore, we can analytically dis-
tinguish financially constrained firms and financially non-constrained firms. So the budget
constraint can be simplified as
a˙t =Az
α
t (µat)
1−α − (µ− 1)rtat − ct − xt if at
zt
≤ 1
µ
(
(1− α)A
rt
)
1
α
A
1
αα(1− α) 1−αα r−
1−α
α
t zt + rtat − ct − xt if
at
zt
>
1
µ
(
(1− α)A
rt
)
1
α .
(1.8)
One important distinction between this setup and similar papers that use a financial con-
straint is that small firms (in terms of assets) are not necessarily constrained. Whether
they are financially constrained only depends on the ratio of assets to productivity, at
zt
. An
entrepreneur who has relatively better productivity is more likely to rent more capital, and
thus has more chance to be financially constrained unless he has enough assets to leverage.
1.2.4 Innovation flow
The basic structure of innovation follows the standard quality ladder introduced in previous
work from Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Acemoglu and Cao (2015)
zt(ξ) = λ
nzs(ξ) (1.9)
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where n is a random variable that represents the number of innovation success between time
s and t. The equation shows the number of successful innovations agent ξ received between
time s and t, s ≤ t. λ is the jump size variable meaning how much they can improve the
productivity from innovation.
An entrepreneur can influence the probability of a successful increase in productivity by
investing in human capital. In particular, an entrepreneur can spend xt units of goods to
generate an innovation flow rate θ xt
zt
. θ is an intensity parameter representing the success
rate of innovation. As they spend more resources in innovation, xt, they have a better chance
to get higher productivity. Specifically, the innovations follow a Poisson process. When a
company invests xt units of goods in innovation, the probability of the number of success
during the short period of time, ∆t is
P (N(∆t) = n) =
(θ xt
zt
∆t)n
n!
e
−θ xt
zt
∆t
. (1.10)
As entrepreneurs invest more resource in innovation, the innovation success rate will increase.
On the other hand, as the current productivity enhances, they should invest more resources
in innovation to keep the same R&D success rate.
1.2.5 Individual behavior and HJB equation
Given the path of the equilibrium interest rate rt, individuals maximize (1.4) subject to (6)
and (7), facing the endogenous innovation Poisson intensity (1.9) and (1.10). A Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the individual maximization problem at time t takes the
following form3
ρVt(a, z)− V˙t(a, z) = max
c,k
log c+
∂Vt
∂a
(Azαk1−α + rt(a− k)− c− x)
+ θ
x
z
(Vt(λz, a)− Vt(z, a))
+ ψt(µa− k)
(1.11)
3Detailed derivation is in Appendix
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subject to
ψt(µa− k) = 0, ψt ≥ 0 (1.12)
The intuition of equation (1.11) is straightforward. The flow rate of the present discounted
value function is equal to the instantaneous utility function plus the marginal utility gain
from saving capital plus the marginal utility gain from innovation. Equation (1.12) gives a
complementary slackness condition.
1.2.6 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is time paths for the distribution of Ωt(z, a) and policy
functions kt(z, a), xt(z, a), ct(z, a) that maximize (1.26) given the path of rt, and satisfy:
• Capital market clearing condition
∫
kt(z, a) dΩt(z, a) =
∫
a dΩt(z, a) (1.13)
• Law of motion of distribution (ω is density of Ω)
∂ωt(z, a)
∂t
= − ∂
∂a
(a˙(z, a)ωt(z, a))− θxt(z, a)
z
ωt(z, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow
+ θ
xt(λ
−1z, a)
λ−1z
ωt(λ
−1z, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow
(1.14)
Physical capital is the only tradable asset in this economy, therefore, we only have one market
clearing condition. Equation (1.14) is the conventional Kolmogorov Forward Equation (KFE)
illustrating the movement of the distribution. The mass at each state (a, z) depends on 2
margins: investment in capital and investment in innovation. As entrepreneurs invest more,
they have greater chances of getting out of the current state. Finally, inflow into a state
comes from agents who are technologically one step behind.
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1.3 Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, we will consider a stationary equilibrium to study the long-run growth effect
of capital misallocation. In a friction-less economy, there is an optimal capital to human
capital ratio because the complementary effect between capital and human capital drives
the economy to keep a balance between them.
In the economy with collateral constraints, capital serves not only as an input, but also
as a collateral to give access to funds for production. Therefore, constrained entrepreneurs
try to overcome financial constraints by investing in capital. This self-financing motivation
temporarily alleviates the misallocation in an individual level.4 However, entrepreneurs
tend to accumulate capital which they otherwise would have invested in innovation thereby
reducing the aggregate efficiency.
1.3.1 Friction-less Economy
Let us start with balanced growth path (BGP) of the friction-less economy.
Theorem 1. (BGP in a friction-less economy) A BGP of the economy is an equilibrium
path where aggregate productivity level, z¯t, and aggregate capital a¯t grow at a constant rate g
and the interest rate rt is constant
r = (1− α)A( a¯
z¯
)−α (1.15)
g = r − ρ (1.16)
where a¯
z¯
is a solution for the following nonlinear equation
θ(λ− 1)αA
( a¯
z¯
)1−α
+ ρ− ρ(λ− 1)
logλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk-adjusted return from R&D
= (1− α)A
( a¯
z¯
)−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Return from physical asset
(1.17)
4This effect is well illustrated in Moll (2014).
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(a) Return on assets v.s R&D (b) Return Spread
Figure 1.2: Return from asset and Return spread by risk
Proof. See the Appendix
Equation (1.38) characterizes the optimal aggregate capital to human capital ratio.5
Figure 1.2a shows the risk-adjusted return from innovation and the return from capital.
Because each asset exhibits diminishing returns, the return from capital (innovation) will
decrease as a¯
z¯
increases (decreases). Therefore, the optimal ratio is determined where the
risk-adjusted innovation return and the capital return meet each other.
Capital asset is a safe asset, but human capital is risky. Therefore, there should be a risk
premium for innovation, ρ(λ−1)
logλ
− ρ. Holding constant the expected return from innovation,
θ(λ−1), Figure 1.2b shows that the risk premium increases as the risk of innovation increases.
On the other hand, the risk premium collapses to 0 as λ → 1. In this case, investment in
innovation is the same as investing in capital because there is no uncertainty. Finally, the
the return from capital (1.36) equals the aggregate marginal productivity of capital.
Relation to AK model and quality ladder model
Through Equations (1.36) to (1.38), we can get the following approximation when λ is around
5We can approximate the optimal asset to human capital ratio
(
a¯
z¯
)optimal ≈ 1−αα 1θ(λ−1) when λ is around
1. The optimal ratio can be different depending on parameters. For example, the ratio will be low as the
human capital share is lower and innovation technology parameters, θ and λ, are higher
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1.
g ≈ αα(1− α)(1−α){θ(λ− 1)}αA− ρ, (1.18)
We can easily see the model follows the simple AK model in the limiting case where human
capital share, α, is 0. On the other hand, the model collapses into the quality ladder model
when α goes to 1.
Unlike the standard misallocation literature, the production function is linear in accumu-
lative assets - capital and human capital. Therefore, the production function is similar to an
AK structure.6 Missing one feature or another makes the economy converge to the steady
state output, which implies that countries’ long-run growth rate will be identical without
exogenously imposing growth rate.
1.3.2 Economy with Financial Friction
In this section, we will show how financial frictions generate inefficiency, thereby lower long-
run growth rate. We will see that inefficiency arises as firms overinvest in physical capital
to get around the constraint. Since solving this two dimensional problem is challenging, let
us start with changing 2-dimensional problem to a 1-dimensional problem where the only
state variable is a˜=a
z
. Another benefit of this approach is that we can easily get a stationary
distribution of a˜.
Theorem 2. (Stationarized HJB equation - Modified Gibrat’s law)
When r > ρ, individual behavior only depends on a˜ = a
z
and V (a, z) = v(a
z
)− 1
ρ
log z where
v(a˜) follows
ρv(a˜) = max
c˜,k˜,x˜
log c˜+
∂v
∂a˜
(Ak˜1−α − rk˜ + ra˜− c˜− x˜)
+ θx˜(v(
a˜
λ
)− v(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ))
+ ψ˜(a˜)(µa˜− k˜)
(1.19)
6The simplest example of AK structure with two accumulative asset is Akα1 k
1−α
2
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Figure 1.3: Return on assets v.s R&D in friction economy
Proof. See the Appendix
Equation (1.19) tells us that entrepreneurs’ behavior only depends on the ratio of capital
to human capital, a˜ ≡ a
z
. More precisely, all the decisions will be scaled by the level of
human capital conditional on a˜. This result implies firms will randomly grow independent
of size conditional on a˜ (Gibrat’s law).
In economy with collateral constraints, the internal cost of borrowing is r+ ψ(a˜)∂v
∂a˜
, and the
gain from accumulating assets is r+ µψ(a˜)∂v
∂a˜
. Therefore, capital is more attractive compared to
friction-less economy. On the other hand, the innovation is relatively less attractive because
the higher internal cost of borrowing reduces the profit from business. As we see Figure
1.3, the return from innovation will be reduced because of aggregate inefficiency, resulting
in a higher capital to human capital ratio and lower equilibrium interest rate. In sum, the
self-financing motivation diverts the resources from innovation.
The output decision is still static even in the stationarized HJB equation. Because of
linearity of return from investment, entrepreneurs invest all resources in either capital or
innovation. Therefore, we can classify the entrepreneurs behavior into 4 stages.
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Figure 1.4: 4 stages of entrepreneur
Corollary 1. There exists a˜∗1 ≡ 1µ( (1−α)Ar )
1
α , a˜∗2 ∈ R+ and a˜∗2 > a˜∗1
ρv(a˜) = max
c˜
log c˜+
∂v
∂a˜
(Aµ1−αa˜1−α − (µ− 1)ra˜− c˜) if a˜ ≤ a˜∗1
max
c˜
log c˜+
∂v
∂a˜
(α(1− α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα + ra˜− c˜) if a˜∗1 < a˜ ≤ a˜∗2
max
x
log (α(1− α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα + ra˜− x˜) + θx˜(v( a˜
λ
)− v˜(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ)) if a˜∗2 < a˜
(1.20)
Proof. See the Appendix
The figure 1.4 illustrates 4 stages of entrepreneurs’ capital accumulation behavior. Below
a˜∗1, entrepreneurs are financially constrained and their collateral constraint will be binding.
Moreover, we can find an analytic solution to the threshold given the interest rate, r. En-
trepreneurs between a˜∗1 and µa˜
∗
1 can borrow as much capital as they need - they are no longer
financially constrained. Above µa˜∗1, they start to lend some of their capital because they
have too much capital compared to their technology. Therefore, the gain from interest will
be eventually higher than the marginal gain from production. At a˜∗2, they begin to invest in
innovation.7 They start to invest in innovation as soon as they reach the threshold point. If
they fail to succeed in innovation, they will stay at the threshold and keep researching, but
if they succeed, their endowed human capital level will jump by λ. Success in innovation has
7The constraint threshold point a˜∗1 is always less than innovation because marginal gain from asset goes
to infinite ∂v∂a˜ → ∞, as a˜ → 0. However, this is not true in the case of friction-less market because the
marginal gain from asset is r.
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(a) Policy function (b) Stationary distribution
Figure 1.5: The example of Saving policy function and Stationary distribution
two trade-offs: (1) The overall productivity level will enhance the efficiency of production,
thereby increasing profit. (2) The capital to human capital ratio will decrease, so the firm
will become financially constrained.
The interesting point here is that entrepreneurs keep accumulating capital even after
they become lenders because of a precautionary saving motive - innovating sooner means
that it takes more time to be non-financially constrained. Therefore, they have an incentive
to accumulate capital and enjoy the current interest for a while.
Definition 1.3.1. (Stationary BGP)
A stationary BGP of this economy is a equilibrium path where the distribution of Ω˜(a˜) and
policy functions k˜(a˜), x˜(a˜), c˜(a˜) that maximize the stationarized HJB equation (1.20) given r
and satisfy:
• Capital market clearing condition
∫
k˜(a˜)dΩ˜(a˜) =
∫
a˜ dΩ˜(a˜) (1.21)
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• Stationary distribution (ω˜ is density of Ω˜)
0 = − ∂
∂a˜
( ˙˜a(a˜)ω˜(a˜))− θx˜(a˜)ω(a˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow
+ θx˜(λa˜)ω˜(λa˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow
(1.22)
and the growth rate of aggregate consumption, capital and human capital is g = r − ρ.
In general, the stationary BGP doesn’t have an analytic solution; thus, we should solve
it computationally. Based on Achdou et al. (2017), we use a finite difference method to solve
the HJB equation and KFE. Furthermore, we extend their method to get the endogenous
innovation threshold point, a˜2, where the entrepreneurs feel indifferent between investing
in either assets. The stationary distribution looks similar to the wealth distribution in a
continuous time version of Huggett (1993) studied again by Achdou et al. (2017). Finally,
we use the algorithm similar to Aiyagari (1994) to find the equilibrium interest rate.
Figure 1.5b describes the general shape of the stationary distribution. The stationary
distribution is the convolution of continuous and discrete distributions and features a Dirac
mass at the innovation threshold point because innovator only has small chance to get a new
technology (intuitively a bottle neck effect). Contrary to the conventional Hugget-Bewley
model and Achdou et al. (2017), the boundary is endogenous as the result of maximiza-
tion behavior. The stationary distribution is closely related to the stages of entrepreneurs.
Because there is only positive drift when they are accumulating capital and success in inno-
vation will decrease the ratio by λ, the mass should be between
a˜∗2
λ
and a˜∗2. This feature is
closely related to the following property.
Proposition 1. If µ > λ, g = goptimal where goptimal is the friction-less aggregate growth
rate.
Proof. See the Appendix
Proposition 1 implies that impact of the capital market imperfection is asymmetric be-
tween underdeveloped countries and developed countries. For financially developed countries
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(a) Long-run growth rate (b) Capital to Human capital
Figure 1.6: Impact of financial market imperfection
(high µ), additional financial reform would not have any further benefit because precaution-
ary self-financing is enough to cover the collateral constraint. On the other hand, the financial
reform will lead to a permanent effect on long-run growth rate for financially underdevel-
oped countries (low µ). This proposition is consistent with the history of financial reforms
in South Korea. There is a consensus that the 1960s financial reforms had a significant effect
on growth miracle in South Korea. The government’s main goal in 1960 was to support
promising companies as a means of export-oriented growth, which included several financial
reforms.8. As a result, the annual growth rates were 9% and 13% in 1960’s and 1970’s,
respectively. On the other hand, there was another large-scale financial reform after the
1997 Asian financial crisis. The IMF-led financial reform was beneficial for South Korea to
recover between 1998 and 2000, but they did not see the growth miracle as they experienced
before because their financial system was already relatively developed.
Figure 1.6a and Figure 1.6b shows the relationship between financial development and
long-run growth rate, and the equilibrium capital to human capital ratio. As expected, the
8First of all, in 1961, they established two major banks, National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation
and the Medium Industry Bank. The establishment led the rapid growth of bank credit. Second, they
revised the Korea Development Bank’s Charter resulting in massive inflow of capital from abroad. Finally
and most importantly, the bank of Korea issued a guarantee to the foreign investor, which increased access
of funds from private firms. See details Cole and Park (1983)
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long run growth rate is lower and the equilibrium capital to human capital ratio increases as
the countries are financially less developed because of over-accumulation of capital. In this
case, self-financing diverts resources from innovation, causing aggregate inefficiency.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we will study the transitional dynamics of the model to evaluate the short-
term effect and the long-term effect of financial reform. A large scale financial reform accel-
erates growth and leads to an innovation boom followed by an investment boom.
1.4.1 Time-varying equilibria
To consider transitional dynamics, we will introduce a time-dependent HJB equation where
the interest rate can change over time.
Theorem 3. (Time dependent HJB equation )
ρvt(a˜)− v˙t(a˜) = max
c,k
log c+
∂vt
∂a˜
(Ak1−α − rtk + rta˜− c− x)
+ θx(vt(
a˜
λ
)− vt(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ))
+ ψt(a˜)(µa− k)
(1.23)
Proof. See the Appendix
The major difference between (1.20) and (1.44) is the presence of v˙t(a˜) which reflects the
fact that the value function changes over time. Accordingly, the definition in Section 2.5
can be replaced by the following definition because the ratio a˜ is independent of the level of
productivity z and innovation follows a random Poisson process.
Definition 1.4.1. (Time-varying equilibria on transition)
An equilibrium of this economy is an equilibrium path where the distribution of Ωt(a˜) and
policy functions k˜t(a˜), x˜t(a˜), c˜t(a˜) maximize the time dependent HJB equation (1.44) given
the path of rt, and satisfy:
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Parameters Values Targets
ρ 0.01 Corresponding discount factor, β = 0.99
α 0.4 Bhandari and McGrattan (2018)
λ 15 Risk premium
A 0.011 Difference between pre-post reform BGP growth rate
θ 5.4 Friction-less BGP growth rate
Table 1.1: The summary of calibrated parameters
• Capital market clearing condition
∫
k˜t(a˜)dΩ˜t(a˜) =
∫
a˜ dΩ˜t(a˜) (1.24)
• Kolmogorov forward equation (ω˜t is density of Ω˜t)
∂ωt(a˜)
∂t
= − ∂
∂a
( ˙˜at(a˜)ωt(a˜))− θx˜t(a˜)ωt(a˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow
+ θx˜t(λa˜)ω˜t(λa˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow
(1.25)
Following Achdou et al. (2017), we changed the algorithm to deal with the threshold
problem and endogenous Poisson process. The detailed computational algorithm is presented
in Appendix.B
1.4.2 Postreform Transitional dynamics
Calibration
In this section, we study the transitional dynamics of an unexpected financial reform
following the same exercise conducted by Moll (2014). Before the reform, the economy stays
at financial autarky (µ = 1). The stark reform will be represented by a sudden increase in
µ (≥ λ) to get the economy to the first best outcome on BGP. There are only 5 parameters
to calibrate in the model. First of all, discount rate, ρ, is set to 0.01 so that it matches a
0.99 annual discount factor commonly used for the neoclassical growth model. The human
capital share is a crucial parameter that governs the magnitude of Asian miracle the model
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Figure 1.7: Transitional dynamics
is set up to predict. It is set to 0.4 following Bhandari and McGrattan (2018) where they
estimate the ratio of intangible asset value to total asset value. The jump size variable, λ,
is set to 15 to match 6 % risk premium between the 10 years US treasury yield and average
S&P 500 return for 10 years. Finally, the total factor productivity, A, and innovation pa-
rameter, θ, are calibrated to match 0% growth before the reform and 2.5% BGP growth rate.
Result
Figure 1.7 shows the transitional dynamics. The results matches the growth experience
of Asian countries well. Not surprisingly, the growth rate at date 0 is higher than the pre-
reform growth rate because of immediate reallocation of capital. Next, an R&D boom follows
the financial reform. This phenomenon can be explained by Figure 1.8a which shows the
two stationary distribution of pre/post reform. Entrepreneurs who have too much capital
compared to human capital start to recognize that capital does not have to be used as
collateral. As we see, the agents above the new innovation threshold point will start to
invest in innovation so that all the entrepreneurs above the point quickly move into the
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region of the post reform stationary distribution. This dynamic movement is well described
in figure 1.8b. The R&D boom will accelerate the growth further by alleviating imbalance
between aggregate capital and human capital, thereby increasing aggregate efficiency. It
takes 30 years to converge to the new BGP growth rate, which is also consistent with the
empirical evidence.
1.5 Conclusion
We develop an endogenous growth model to study the impact of financial constraints on
economic growth through capital misallocation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper encompassing the following features: 1) endogenous growth - related to long-
run growth effect of the financial market imperfection, 2) persistent transition without any
exogenous TFP assumption, 3) capturing the full picture of the Asian Miracle from pre-
reform to the long term growth rates. Misallocation induced by capital market imperfection
affects not only the level of output but also the growth rate of the economy at steady state.
The model exhibits both transitory (short-term, but persistent) impacts as well as permanent
impacts (long-term). Self-financing and overaccumulation of safe assets divert resources from
optimal investment in R&D. This results in an imbalance between R&D and capital.
We also match the historical features of Asian countries’ persistent rapid growth after
financial reforms. There is a stark innovation boom following the reforms which leads the
economy to balance its investment in capital and human capital. The aggregate inefficiency
fades out as entrepreneurs start to invest in innovation and the growth rate eventually
converges to a higher growth rate than the pre-reform growth rate. dfd
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(a) Stationary distributions (b) Dynamics of asset distribution
Figure 1.8: Dynamics of distributions
1.6 Appendix A
1.6.1 Derivation of HJB
Individuals’ decision can be represented with the following HJB equation
ρVt(a, z)− V˙t(a, z) = max
c,k,x
log c+
∂Vt
∂a
(Azαk1−α + rt(a− k)− c− x)
+ θ
x
z
(Vt(λz, a)− Vt(z, a))
+ ψt(µa− k)
(1.26)
subject to
ψt(µa− k) = 0, ψt ≥ 0 (1.27)
Proof. Denote probability space (Ω,F , P ) where Ω is a set of innovation outcomes starting
at date t, F is a σ-field of Ω. P : F → [0, 1] generated by Poisson process of (1.9) and (1.10).
Suppose {c∗t (ω), a∗t (ω), k∗t (ω), x∗t (ω)} is the optimal solution of the problem where agents
maximize his utility (1.4) subject to constraints (1.6) and (1.7), and Poisson jump process
(1.9) and (1.10). Here ω is a sample path of Ω. Let us define the value function at time t as
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Vt(at, zt) =
∫
Ω
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) log c∗s(ω) dsdP (ω) (1.28)
Then
Et[Vt+∆(a
∗
t+∆(ω), zt+∆(ω))] =
∫
Ω
∫ ∞
t+∆
e−ρ(s−(t+∆)) log c∗s(ω) dsdP (ω) (1.29)
Using the method of change variable, we can get
Et[Vt+∆(a
∗
t+∆(ω), zt+∆(ω))]− Vt(at, zt) =
∫
Ω
{
(1− e−ρ∆)
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) log c∗s+∆(ω) dsdP (ω)
−
∫ t+∆
t
e−ρ(s−t) log c∗s(ω) ds
}
dP (ω)
(1.30)
After divide the equation by ∆ and take a limit,
lim
∆→0
Et[Vt+∆(a
∗
t+∆(ω), zt+∆(ω))]− Vt(at, zt)
∆
= ρVt(at, zt)− log c∗t (1.31)
Please note that the probabilities of the number of jump received in a small time interval
∆ at date t are P (0; ∆) = 1−θ xt
zt
∆+o(∆), P (1; ∆) = θ xt
zt
∆+o(∆), and
∑∞
j P (j : ∆) = o(∆)
where o(·) is a little o function. Using the definition of value function, equation (1.29) cab
be expressed as
Et[Vt+∆(a
∗
t+∆(ω), zt+∆(ω))]− Vt(at, zt) = (1− θ
xt
zt
∆ + o(∆))Vt+∆(a
∗
t+∆(ω), zt)
+ (θ
xt
zt
∆ + o(∆))Vt+∆(a
∗
t+∆(ω), λzt) + o(∆)
− Vt(at, zt).
(1.32)
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Rearranging and manipulating equation (1.32) lead
Et[Vt+∆(a
∗
t+∆(ω), zt+∆(ω))]− Vt(at, zt) = (1− θ
x∗t
zt
∆ + o(∆)){Vt+∆(a∗t+∆(ω), zt)− Vt(a∗t+∆(ω), zt)}
+ (θ
x∗t
zt
∆ + o(∆)){Vt+∆(a∗t+∆(ω), λzt)− Vt(a∗t+∆(ω), λzt)}
+ Vt(a
∗
t+∆(ω), zt)− Vt(at, zt)
+ (θ
x∗t
zt
∆ + o(∆)){Vt(a∗t+∆(ω), λzt)− Vt(a∗t+∆(ω), zt)}+ o(∆)
(1.33)
After divide the equation by ∆ and take a limit,
lim
∆→0
Et[Vt+∆(a
∗
t+∆(ω), zt+∆(ω))]− Vt(at, zt)
∆
= V˙t(at, zt)+
∂Vt
∂a
a˙t+θ
x∗t
zt
(Vt(a
∗
t (ω), λzt)−Vt(a∗t (ω), zt))
(1.34)
Equation (1.31) and (1.34) imply
ρVt(at, zt)− V˙t(at, zt) = log c∗t +
∂Vt
∂a
a˙t + θ
x∗t
zt
(Vt(a
∗
t (ω), λzt)− Vt(a∗t (ω), zt)) (1.35)
where a˙t is a budget constraint (1.10). Here we skip complementary-slackness condition
(CSC) because variables are the optimal solution. However, when we define HJB recursively,
we need to put CSC condition.
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1.6.2 Proof of theorem 1
Theorem 1
A BGP of the economy is an equilibrium path where aggregate productivity level, z¯t, and
aggregate capital a¯t grow at a constant rate g and the interest rate rt is constant
r = (1− α)A( a¯
z¯
)−α (1.36)
g = r − ρ (1.37)
where a¯
z¯
is a solution for the following nonlinear equation
θ(λ− 1)αA
( a¯
z¯
)1−α
+ ρ− ρ(λ− 1)
logλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk-adjusted return from R&D
= (1− α)A
( a¯
z¯
)−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Return from physical asset
(1.38)
Proof. This is a sketch of proof. Let us start to examine a special case where there are only
two states, (a, 0) and (0, z). Given the equilibrium interest rate r,
ρV (a, 0) = max
c
logc+
∂V
∂a
(ra− c) (1.39)
The well known analytic solution is
V (a, 0) =
1
ρ
log a+
1
ρ
log ρ+
r − ρ
ρ2
. (1.40)
and the rate of capital accumulation is a˙
a
= r − ρ. On the other hand, entrepreneurs owns
productivity
ρV (0, z) = max
x
log(α(1− α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα z − x) + θx
z
(V (0, λz)− V (0, z))9 (1.41)
9This is not generally true because entrepreneurs have an option to accumulate capital. It turns out that
switching investment is not optimal in friction-less economy.
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The corresponding analytic solution is
V (0, z) =
1
ρ
logz − 1
ρ
log(
θ
ρ
logλ) +
θ
ρ2
α(1− α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα logλ− 1
ρ
. (1.42)
the rate of human capital accumulation is E[ z˙
z
] =
{
θα(1 − α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα − ρ
log λ
}
(λ − 1).
On the BGP, aggregate capital and human capital grow at the same rate. Therefore,
{
θα(1− α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα − ρ
log λ
}
(λ− 1) = r − ρ (1.43)
We can solve for r and get the optimal ratio of a
z
1.6.3 Proof of theorem 2 and 3
Theorem 3.
Individual behavior only depends on a˜ = a
z
and Vt(a, z) = vt(
a
z
)− 1
ρ
log z where vt(a˜) follows
ρvt(a˜)− v˙t(a˜) = max
c˜,k˜,x˜
log c˜+
∂vt
∂a˜
(Ak˜1−α − rtk˜ + rta˜− c˜− x˜)
+ θx˜(vt(
a˜
λ
)− vt(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ))
+ ψ˜t(a˜)(µa˜− k˜)
(1.44)
Proof. Denote u˜ = u
z
where u are variables. (For example, a˜ = a
z
.). Guess Vt(a, z) =
vt(
a
z
) + 1
ρ
logz. Subtracting logz from the both side of equation (1.26) yields
ρVt(a, z)− V˙t(a, z)− logz = max
c,k,x
log c˜+
∂Vt
∂a
(Azαk1−α − rtk + rta− c− x)
+ θ
x
z
(Vt(a, λz)− Vt(a, z))
+ ψt(a)(µa− k)
(1.45)
Please note that ∂Vt
∂a
= ∂vt
∂a
1
z
and Vt(a, λz)−Vt(a, z) = vt( a˜λ)− vt(a˜) + 1ρ log(λ). Therefore,
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ρvt(a˜)− v˙t(a˜) = max
c˜,k˜,x˜
log c˜+
∂vt
∂a˜
(Ak˜1−α − rtk˜ + rta˜− c˜− x˜)
+ θx˜(vt(
a˜
λ
)− vt(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ))
+ ψ˜t(a˜)(µa˜− k˜)
(1.46)
1.6.4 Proof of corollary 2
Corollary 2.
When r > ρ, there exists a˜∗1 ≡ 1µ( (1−α)Ar )
1
α , a˜∗2 ∈ R+ and a˜∗2 > a˜∗1
ρv(a˜) = max
c˜
log c˜+
∂v
∂a˜
(Aµ1−αa˜1−α − (µ− 1)ra˜− c˜) if a˜ ≤ a˜∗1
max
c
log c˜+
∂v
∂a˜
(α(1− α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα + ra˜− c˜) if a˜∗1 < a˜ ≤ a˜∗2
max
x
log (α(1− α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα + ra˜− x˜) + θx˜(v( a˜
λ
)− v(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ)) if a˜∗2 < a˜
(1.47)
Proof. First of all, the financial constraint threshold is straightforward because the produc-
tion choice is a purely static problem. The optimal amount of capital utilized for uncon-
strained firm should satisfy the first order condition,
(1− α)Ak˜−α = r. (1.48)
Therefore, k∗ = ( (1−α)A
r
)
1
α . Therefore, entrepreneurs below than k
∗
µ
will borrow as much as
they can (i.e constraints are binding).
Second, entrepreneurs invest all resources in either capital or innovation. This is simply
because of the linearity of return from investment. The marginal return from capital is ∂v
∂a˜
and the marginal return from innovation is θ(v( a˜
λ
) − v(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ)). Therefore, if ∂v
∂a˜
>
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θ(v( a˜
λ
)− v(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ)). They will invest all resources in capital, and vice versa.
Third, we need to show that entreprenuers are accumulating capital when they have rel-
atively low asset, a˜. Let us start to introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
1) There exists  s.t lima↓0 v′(a˜) =∞ if a˜ ∈ [0, )
2) There exists  s.t v′′(a˜) < 0 if a˜ ∈ [0, )
3) lima↓0 θ(v( a˜λ)− v(a˜) + 1ρ log(λ)) = θρ log(λ)
4) θ(v( a˜
λ
)− v(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ)) < θ
ρ
log(λ)
proof of lemma 1
1) The optimal condition for consumption is 1
c˜∗ = max(v
′(a˜), θ(v( a˜
λ
)− v(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ)). Be-
cause v(0) = 0 and c∗ = 0 as a˜→ 0, lima˜↓0 v′(a˜) =∞
2) The second property comes from the 1st property of lemma 1 and v′′(a˜) = − 1
c∗(a˜)
∂c∗(a˜)
∂a˜
.
3) This is straight forward because v(0)=0
4) v(·) is increasing.
The first two properties imply that marginal return from capital is bigger than marginal
return from innovation when a˜ is low.
Finally, we want to show a˜∗1 < a˜
∗
2. Suppose this is not true. Then, we can find the
smallest a˜∗2 > 0 satisfying
ρv(a˜) = max
x
log (Aµ1−αa˜1−α − (µ− 1)ra˜− x˜) + θx˜(v( a˜
λ
)− v(a˜) + 1
ρ
log(λ)) (1.49)
Please note that agent, a˜ ∈ [0, a∗2) invests in capital because of 1) of Lemma 1. Equa-
tion (1.49) is the case where they are financially constrained, but investing in innovation.
Differentiating equation (1.49) with respect a˜ implies
ρv′(a˜∗2) =
1
c˜∗
{
(1− α)Aµ1−αa˜∗−α2 − (µ− 1)
}
+ θx˜∗(
1
λ
v′(
a˜∗2
λ
)− v′(a˜∗2)). (1.50)
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Because v′′(·) < 0 and v′′′(·) > 0 if a˜ ∈ [0, ), the last term, θx∗( 1
λ
v′( a˜
∗
2
λ
) − v′(a˜∗2)), is
positive. Also, the marginal return from asset, (1−α)Aµ1−αa˜−α− (µ− 1) > r because firms
are financially constrained. This implies
ρv′(a˜∗2) >
r
c˜∗
= rθ(v(
a˜∗2
λ
)− v(a˜∗2) +
1
ρ
logλ). (1.51)
Rearranging
v′(a˜)
θ(v( a˜
λ
)− v(a˜) + 1
ρ
logλ)
>
r
ρ
> 1 (1.52)
which implies return from capital is higher than return from innovation. This is a contradic-
tion to the assumption that there is a financially constrained firm who invests in innovation.
1.6.5 Proof of proposition 1
Proposition 1.
If µ ≥ λ, g = goptimal where goptimal is the friction-less aggregate growth rate.
Proof. x
Let us introduce Lemma 2.
Lemma 2.
1) ω˜(a˜) > 0 for any a˜ ∈ U ≡ [ a˜∗2
λ
, a˜∗2] and ω˜(a˜) = 0 for a˜ 6∈ U
2)Given the equilibrium interest rate r, the innovation threshold point a˜∗2 is greater than µa˜
∗
1
proof of lemma 2
1) From corollary 2, x˜∗(a˜∗2) > 0 and x˜(a˜) = 0 if a˜ 6= a˜∗2. Moreover, ˙˜a > 0 for any a˜ ∈ (0,∞).
Intuitively, this implies the budget constraint has always positive drift (outflow) and the
only inflow is coming from a˜∗2. Therefore, there is no mass outside [
a˜∗2
λ
, a˜∗2]
2) If a˜∗2 < µa˜
∗
1, KMF equation (1.22) implies ω˜(a˜) = 0 for a˜ ∈ [µa˜∗1,∞) from 1) of Lemma 2.
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Because k˜∗(a˜) > a˜ for a˜ ∈ [0, µa˜∗1),
∫
k˜∗(a˜)dΩ˜(a˜) >
∫
a˜ dΩ˜(a˜) which contradicts the market
clearing condition.
Assume g < goptimal and µ ≥ λ. g < goptimal implies that there is strictly positive mass
in the constrained region, ∃ a˜f ∈ (0, a˜∗1) where ω˜(a˜f ) > 0. Otherwise, the constrained
problem coincides with the unconstrained problem which is the case of friction-less economy,
therefore, the collateral constraint doesn’t play any role. On the other hand, because of 2)
of Lemma 2
a˜∗2
λ
≥ a˜
∗
2
µ
>
µa˜∗1
µ
= a˜∗1
Therefore, ω˜(a˜) = 0 if a˜ ≤ a˜∗1. This is a contradiction to ω˜(a˜f ) > 0.
1.7 Appendix B
1.7.1 Stationary HJB equation
We extend a finite difference method based on Achdou et al. (2017). Specifically, we take
the implicit method for computational efficiency and it doesn’t rely on the updating size for
value function iteration, ∆. The problem, (1.47) is different from theirs in two ways : 1)
Poisson intensity is endogenous 2) The boundary, a˜∗2 is endogenous. Given the boundary
point, a˜j∗2 where where j is the index for the possible boundary points, j = 1, ..., J . We
approximate (1.47) with I discrete points. Therefore, the grid points lie between amin and
a˜j∗2 . Starting from v
0 = (v01, ..., v
0
I ), we update the value function following
v
(j),n+1
i − v(j),ni
∆
+ρv
(j),n+1
i = log c
(j),n
i +
v
(j),n+1
i+1 − v(j),n+1i
∆a
(Aµ1−αa˜1−αi − (µ− 1)ra˜i − c(j),ni )︸ ︷︷ ︸
si
if a˜i ≤ a˜∗1
30
= log c
(j),n
i +
v
(j),n+1
i+1 − v(j),n+1i
∆a
(α(1− α) 1−αα A 1α r− 1−αα + ra˜i − c(j),ni )︸ ︷︷ ︸
si
if a˜∗1 ≤ a˜i ≤ a˜∗2
= log c
(j),n
I +θ (α(1− α)
1−α
α A
1
α r−
1−α
α + raI − c(j),nI )︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
(v(
aI
λ
)−v(j),nI +
1
ρ
log(λ)) if ai = a˜
j∗
2
∆ is the step size for update and ∆a is the distance between grid points. Please note
that aI = a˜
j
2. The optimal consumption c
(j),n
i , can be computed by (
v
(j),n
i+1 −v(j),ni
∆a
)−1 We can
rewrite down the problem, (1.47), as the following matrix form.
1
∆
(vn+1 − vn) + ρvn+1 = un +Hnvn+1
where
un =

log cn1
...
log cnI + θx
1
ρ log(λ)
 , Hn =

− s1∆a s1∆a 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
0 − s2∆a s2∆a · · · · · · · · · · · ·
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · − sI−1∆a sI−1∆a
0 0 0 θx · · · · · · −θx

which can be rewritten as
Bnvn+1 = bn, Bn = (
1
∆
+ ρ)I −Hn, bn = un + 1
∆
vn.
We update the value function until v(j),n+1 is arbitrary close to v(j),n+1. Finally, we
repeat this exercise for J possible endogenous points and choose the correct boundary point,
aj
′
2 where it maximizes vi at every grid points.
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1.7.2 Kolmogorov Forward Equation
We are looking for a stationary distribution. The corresponding KMF equation is
0 = − ∂
∂a
( ˙˜a(a˜)ω(a˜))− θx(a˜)ω(a˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflow
+ θx(λa˜)ω˜(λa˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflow
(1.53)
We discretize this as
0 = −[sigi]′ + θxgI1(i = i′)− θxgI1(i = I) for i = 2, ..., I − 1 (1.54)
where [sigi]
′ is approximated as
gisi − gi−1si−1
∆a
(1.55)
i′ is the indicator index for a2
λ
representing the closest grid point to
a˜∗2
λ
. The system of
equation from (1.53) to (1.55) can be easily computed through HTg = 0 where HT is the
transpose of the transition matrix we get from Appendix B.1. Finally, we can obtain the
stationary distribution by calculating the eigenvector of HT and satisfying g′∆a = 1 which
represents the mass should sum up to 1.
1.7.3 Stationary equilibrium
We use the well known algorithm following Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). Given the
interest rate r, we can get the stationary HJB equation and KMF equation and use them to
compute the stationary distribution, g. In equilibrium, the capital market should be cleared
which means
I∑
i
k∗i (ai)gi∆a︸ ︷︷ ︸
AggregateDemand
=
I∑
i
aigi∆a︸ ︷︷ ︸
AggregateSupply
(1.56)
Therefore, if aggregate demand is greater than the waaggregate supply, we update interest
rate by increasing, and vice versa until it converges.
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CHAPTER 2
Micro to Macro: Do network linkages matter?
Aggregate fluctuations are a major feature of the economy, and a large portion of macroe-
conomic research has been devoted to analyzing the origin of these fluctuations. While
economy-wide shocks (e.g. monetary policy, oil shock and war) have commonly been thought
to be an important driver to induce aggregate fluctuations, individual shocks have been over-
looked because they would be averaged out among many agents. Several novel papers such
as Johnson (2014)and Durlauf (1993) try to generate aggregate fluctuations from the micro-
level, but these models have not been widely accepted by economists due to the strong
assumptions of the models, their tractability or their inability to match the data.
However, two pioneering recent papers, Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2012), have
offered a challenge to this dominant point of view. Gabaix (2011) focuses on the implications
of Zipf’s law distribution of firm size, first noticed by Axtell (2001). Based on his random
growth theory (Gabaix (1999)), which provides a theoretical base for Zipf’s law, he argues
that when the distribution of firms has fat tails, the dissipating rate of idiosyncratic shocks
follows lnN instead of
√
N , which implies a much slower convergence rate. Subsequently, he
generates a measure of firm level, idiosyncratic shocks, which he calls the granular residual,
in order to inspect the co-movement between these shocks and aggregate fluctuations.
On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2012) focus on the asymmetric network structure
of firms in the economy. LikeGabaix (2011), the dissipating rate of idiosyncratic shocks
might become much slower as the network structure grows unbalanced. Upstream firms
productivity change might induce aggregate shocks even if the number of firms goes to
infinity (Cascading effect).
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To give some intuition on the difference between these two ideas, Gabaix (2011) is con-
cerned with the fact that GM is a big company, while Acemoglu et al. (2012) focuses on its
influential linkages to other companies (which may or may not be related to its size). This
paper begins from the premise that each of these factors plays an important role. Ignoring
either piece would result in an incomplete picture of the impact of firms on the economy.
The goal of the paper is to develop a tractable multi-sector model that can explore the effects
of firm size and sectoral linkages simultaneously.
Even though monopolistic competition is widely used in the heterogeneous firms litera-
ture, it has not been frequently employed in the granularity literature. Gaubert and Itskhoki
(2016) incorporate the feature in the finite firm level framework, but they don’t have network
linkages between firms or sectors and their focus is more on comparative advantage rather
than idiosyncratic shocks. Di Giovanni et al. (2014) also emphasize the importance of the
network with empirical evidence under monopolistic competition.
Most closely related to this paper is Baqaee (2014), which shares a similar setup, but
there are two key differences. First, he focuses on the extensive margin of firm entry and
exit, while this paper confines analysis to existing firms in the spirit of Gabaix (2011). The
setup of the model in this paper is also much more conducive to empirical analysis, which is
absent in Baqaee (2014). Finally, this paper directly corresponds to the recent literature.
One might think size already includes the information of the input-output structure
because intermediate demand is also another determinant of firm sales as well as consumer
demand and productivity. In the competitive market, the argument is true - sales of a
firm is a sufficient statistic for the influence of an individual company,which was proved by
Hulten (1978) in the competitive market. However, this paper shows that in the presence
of monopolistic competition, Hulten’s theorem doesn’t hold. Therefore, network linkages
matter when it comes to granularity.
In section 2, I’ll set up the basic framework of a multi-sector monopolistic competition
model. Section 3 will directly clarify the linkage between the model and the existing literature
through variance decomposition. Finally, I will define the new granular residual driven by the
34
model, and then use it to conduct empirical analysis and compare it with Gabaix’s previous
measure.
2.1 Model
I extend Acemoglu et al. (2012) by introducing a multi-sector version of Melitz (2003). For
simplicity, I assume there is no entry and exit. One might also think the model as a static
version of Long and Plosser (1983) incorporating monopolistically competitive heterogeneous
firms.
2.1.1 Household
The representative household inelastically supplies 1 unit of labor and has Cobb-Douglas
preferences over S sector goods.
u(C) = A
S∏
i=1
Cβii (2.1)
Ci is a consumption aggregator originating from sector i. A is a constant, which will be de-
fined later to normalize price index. The agent maximizes his utility subject to the following
budget constraint.
S∑
i=1
PiCi = W + Π
Pi is the price index of consumption aggregator i. Wage is denoted by W . Π is aggregate
profit from monopolistic firms in this economy.
Π =
S∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
piu,idu
2.1.2 CES aggregator in sector s
There is a continum of varieties in each sector. To analyze granularity, the assumption of
infinitely many firms will be modified in section 3. The composite good follows the form of
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Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Qi =
[ ∫ 1
0
q
η−1
η
u,i du
] η
η−1 (2.2)
qu,i is the quantity of goods firm u produces in sector i. η is the elasticity of substitution
between two varieties . Given the set of price of each variety, pu,i, agents want to maximize
Qi across varieties. As a result, the price index of specific sector product is
Pi =
[ ∫ 1
0
p1−ηu,i du
] 1
1−η (2.3)
Finally, demand for an individual variety, qu,i is
qu,i =
(pu,i
Pi
)−η
Qi (2.4)
The economy can use each good either to consume or use as an intermediate input to produce
other goods.
2.1.3 Firms
The technology of each firm follows constant returns to scale. However, they need to use
labor and CES aggregated sector goods as intermediate inputs to produce. Each variety in
sector i is produced by the monopolistically competitive firm, u. That is, the technology of
individual firm u in sector i has the following technology.
qu,i = zu,il
α
u,i
S∏
j=1
X
ωij(1−α)
u,i,j (2.5)
Xu,i,j is the intermediate input from sector j that a firm u in sector i demands in order to
produce its own good. ωi,j is the share of good j, which sum to 1 to maintain constant
return to scale. Each monopolistically competitive firm wants to maximize his profit given
demand for his variety. Unlike Acemoglu et al (2012), heterogenity arises through the level
of technology zu,i and unlike Gabaix(2011), there are network linkages across sectors through
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the intermediate goods. The profit maximization problem is given by
piu,i = max
pu,i
pu,iqu,i −Wlu,i −
S∑
j=1
PjXu,i,j (2.6)
subject to the production technology equation (5) and the demand of his variety (4).
Firm’s optimal solution in sector i
pu,i =
η
η − 1
MCi
zu,i
(2.7)
MCi =
(W
α
)α
( ξi
1− α
)1−α
(2.8)
ξi =
S∏
j=1
( Pj
ωij
)ωij (2.9)
qu,i =
(pu,i
Pi
)−η
Qi (2.10)
lu,i =
( α
1− α
)1−α( ξi
W
)1−α qu,i
zu,i
(2.11)
Xu,i,j =
ξiωij
Pj
(1− α
α
)α(W
ξi
)α qu,i
zu,i
(2.12)
Although it appears complicated, this optimal solution can be summarized by three
intuitive ideas: (1) price is a constant markup over marginal cost. (2) quantity is determined
by the firm’s relative pricing position over aggregate price. (3)
Wlu,i
PjXu,i,j
= α
(1−α)ωij or in
words, wage payment to intermediate expenditure ratio depends only on the ratio of labor
and the intermediate share parameter and doesn’t differ across firms endowed with different
technology in the same sector. The proof is almost similar to other monopolistic competition
literature except multiple inputs.
2.1.4 General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the economy consists of
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(1) A set of prices
The price index of CES aggregated goods {Pi}i=Si=1
The wage W
(2) A set of allocations
Consumption bundle {ci}i=Si=1
Labor {{lu,i}u}i=Si=1
Intermediate Goods {{Xu,i,j}u}j=Sj=1 }i=Si=1
such that
1) The representative household maximizes his utility
2) Individual monopolistically competitive firms in each sector maximize profits
3) Markets clear
Labor:
s∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
lu,idu = 1
Goods in each sector:
Ci +
S∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
Xu,j,idu = Qi for ∀i = 1, · · · , S
4) Aggregator consistency
Qi =
[ ∫ 1
0
q
η−1
η
u,i du
] η
η−1
Pi =
[ ∫ 1
0
p1−ηu,i du
] 1
1−η
Analysis of General Equilibrium
In the setup of Acemoglu et al. (2012), they showed the logarithm of real value added is
the sum of log sectoral shocks adjusted by it’s influence. I show that even in the environment
of monopolistic competition, the same implication arises.
The proof here follows a similar method. The result looks similar, but is different in that
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Acemoglu et al. (2012) don’t have the feature of the firm heterogenity and monopolistic
competition.
Proposition 1 (Logarithm of real value added)
y = log(C/P ) = v′ (2.13)
where
v′ = αβ′[I − (1− α)Ω]−1, Ω(i,j) = ωij, i = 1
α
log
({∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
} 1
η−1
)
Proof: See the appendix
One interesting result of both Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Gabaix (2011) is that its
influence vector is equal to the sales ratio. This is the result of Hulten’s theorem (1978).
Therefore, firm sales (size) to GDP ratio is sufficient statistic to calculate the contribution of
individual firm on economy. In other words, size already includes the information of network
channels.
However, Hulten(1978)’s theorem doesn’t hold in the presence of monopolistic competi-
tion. The following proposition is one of the primary contributions of this paper.
Proposition 2
In the presence of monopolistic competition, firm size is not sufficient statistic to measure
the individual firm’s impact on economy. That is, there is discrepancy between influence
vector and sales vector.
v′ = αβ′[I − (1− α)Ω]−1
s′ =
1 + α(η − 1)
η
β′[I − (1− α)η − 1
η
Ω]−1
Proof: See the appendix
s′ is the equilibrium sales vector as ratio of GDP. We can easily see that influence vector
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and sales fraction becomes equalized when economy becomes more competitive as a limiting
case. (i.e η goes to infinity). The proposition 3 tells us that firm size relative to whole
economy under/over-estimate the impact of each sector. To understand actual influence of
each firm, we need details of input-output network between sector. That is, the influence
structure is important as much as large firms are important.
2.2 Linkage with recent literature of granularity
To analyze granularity, we need to change the continuous firm assumption and allow for a
finite number of firms. In this case, there can be a small difference in the optimal solution
of the firm. However, to simplify our discussion, here I impose an ad-hoc pricing rule where
mark up is constant. This assumption ensures that all propositions hold even in the finite
firm level case. To get a more accurate result, we should use the variable mark-up approach.1
However, this approach is beyond the scope of this paper so that I leave this adjustment for
future research.
As we have shown in (13), the log of GDP is the linear combination of the sectoral
influence component and the geometric mean of individual firm technology in each sector.
Suppose firm growth follows the following process
log(zk,i,t)− log(zk,i,t−1) ≡ gk,i,t = Gt + gi,t + ek,i,t (2.14)
where k is the individual firm index, Gt is the macro shock which influences firm commonly
across sector and individual firm, the sectoral shock is denoted by git, and eu,i,t is the idiosyn-
cratic shock that will eventually form the granular residual , which is what we are interested
in. To measure the pure effect of an individual shock, I impose the further assumption that
1Still, constant mark-up can be a good approximation of variable mark-up. As the number of firms in
a sector increases, it’s error term decreases. For the literature on finite firm level pricing, Atkeson and
Burnstein (2008) and Gaubert and Itskhoki (2016) are good references. The former uses variable mark-up
with oligopolistic competition in quantities, the latter uses same approach, but with competition in pricing.
I’ll include this feature in future research.
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the shocks are independent. Finally, I assume that ek,i,t has mean 0 and finite variance,
which follows the spirit of Gibrat’s law used by Gabaix (1999) to exhibit the Zipf’s law of
firm size distribution (Random growth theory). For notational convenience, I assume zα is
the technology level of the firm follows instead of z. This helps to cancel out 1
α
in front of ,
but the underlying logic would remain as same as before. Equivalently we can assume
log(zk,i,t)− log(zk,i,t−1) ≡ gk,i,t = α(Gt + gi,t + ek,i,t)
Proposition 3 (Decomposition of variance of growth)
Suppose individual firm growth follows the process (14). Further, Gt, git, ek,i,t are indepen-
dent from each other. ek,i,t is also independent across firms. Then,
σ2∆(log(yt)) = σ
2
G +
S∑
i=1
v2i σ
2
g,i +
S∑
i=1
Ni∑
k=1
v2i (
Sk,i,t−1
Yi
)2σ2e,k,i (2.15)
where
Sk,i,t−1 : Sales of k firm in sector i at t-1
Yi,t−1 : Aggregate real value added of sector i at t-1
Ni : Number of firm in sector i
v′ = αβ′[I − (1− α)Ω]−1 : Influence vector
σ2∆(log(yt)) : Variance of growth in GDP.
σ2G : Variance of macro shock.
σ2g,i : Variance of sectoral shock.
σ2e,k,i : Variance of k firm’s idiosyncratic shock in sector i.
Proof: See the appendix
This proposition tells us that aggregate fluctuation can be explained by 1) Aggregate
shocks 2) Sectoral shocks and 3) Idiosyncratic shocks which is the ’new’ granular residual
slightly different from other literature. The last term is the channel through which an
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individual shock can affect aggregate fluctuation.
S∑
i=1
Ni∑
k=1
v2i (
Sk,i,t−1
Yi,t
)2σ2e,k,i (2.16)
Like the other literature, it depends on firm size, Si,k, but unlike the other literature, the
shock can be propagated through network linkages. It is noteworthy that the influence vector,
v′ becomes s′(sector sales to GDP ratio) when the economy becomes perfect competition (i.e
η goes to infinite). Then, the last term becomes
N∑
k=1
(
Skt
GDPt
)2σ2e,k
where N becomes total number of firm existing in the economy and i is the index of the
firm in any sector. We can easily see sales to GDP ratio becomes a sufficient statistic to
measure the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on the economy in this case. Therefore, the
granular residual of Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) is the limiting case of the
’new’ granular residual produced by the model.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
The main goal of this section is to compare the ’New’ granular residual driven by the model
and the existing granular residual from Gabaix (2011). To do so, I use the same data set as
the paper, but a different data cleaning method, which gives a more precise representation.
2.3.1 Empirical implementation
To calculate labor productivity of firm k in i sector, I use a naive proxy for the labor
productivity most literature used.
zk,i,t =
sales of firm k in year t
Number of workers in firm k in year t
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Therefore, we can calculate growth rate of productivity by taking log difference denoted by
γk,i,t ≡ (log(zk,i,t)− log(zk,i,t−1)) and γk,i,t follows the growth process (14).
Even though we have full specification of variance decomposition (15), we cannot conduct
a full variance decomposition analysis. The following argument will clarify this point of view.
According to the setup, γˆi,t ≡ 1Ni
Ni∑
k=1
γk,i,t is a consistent estimator of Gt + git. On the other
hand, one might measure Gt with Gˆt ≡ 1N
S∑
i=1
Ni∑
k=1
γk,i,t where N =
S∑
i=1
Ni. However, it is not
a consistent estimator of Gt with respect to Ni. To get a consistent estimator, we need the
additional assumption that the number of sectors also goes to infinity or that there are no
sector shocks. That is, aggregate effects are not identifiable even though the number of firms
is infinite. (i.e Gˆt
p→ Gt + q′gt). gt is the S×1 consisting of sector shock at time t. q’ is
the speed of divergence of Ni.
2 Therefore, I want to focus on contribution of idiosyncratic
shocks to GDP, which is fully identifiable and our main interest of this paper.
For comparison with Gabaix (2011), I consider the case where there is no sectoral shock
(i.e git = 0 ). Then, the new granular residual becomes
ΓNewt =
S∑
i=1
Ni∑
k=1
vi(
Sk,i,t−1
Yi,t
)(γk,i,t − Gˆt) (2.17)
This is equal to Gabaix(2011)’s measure when the influence vector is equal to sales vector.
ΓGabaixt =
N∑
k=1
(
Sk,t−1
Yt
)(γk,t − Gˆt) (2.18)
On the other hand, the new granular residual with sector demeaning corresponding to (16)
is
ΓNewt =
S∑
i=1
Ni∑
k=1
vi(
Sk,i,t−1
Yi,t
)(γk,i,t − γˆi,t) (2.19)
2Intuitively, you can think q’gt is the weighted average sector shock depending on number of firms in each
sector.
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ΓGabaixt =
S∑
i=1
Ni∑
k=1
(
Sk,t−1
Yt
)(γk,t − γˆk,i,t) (2.20)
2.3.2 Data & Result
To calculate (17) - (20), we need to calculate the influence vector, v′ = αβ′[I − (1− α)Ω]−1.
Ω is the input-output matrix which is available from the I-O accounts data of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Following Acemoglu et al. (2012), I use commodity-by-industry
direct requirements from 1997 to 2014. 3. Also, I use the use table valued at purchasers
prices to get the personal expenditure data by sector. Finally, I set α equal to 0.66 which is
the labor share of GDP.
Figure 1 shows discrepancy between sales and the influence vector driven by network
linkages, which is contrast to existing literature. For example, GDP share underestimates
the impact of the service sector, manufacturing and finance sector. However, it overestimates
the impact of the other sectors.4 In this experiment, the mean of the influence vector from
1997 to 2007 will be used for vi, because detail data is not available before 1997.
For firm level productivity, I use the annual U.S. Compustat data from 1951 to 2014.
I drop the firms that do not have employment and sales data for the previous year. I use
the price index and real GDP from BEA. Then, I calculate real sales revenue of each firm,
taking 2009 price level as a base. For comparison with Gabaix (2011), I choose top 100 firms
with respect to net sales in the last period, replacing any drops with the next highest firm,
and measure individual firm’s productivity to calculate granular residual. However, I use
the mean productivity growth of all firms for Gˆt or γit, which is an efficient estimator. As
Gabaix mentions in his paper, for the case of extreme extraordinary events such as merging
among companies, I winsorize the productivity growth rates at 40%.
3”The direct requirements indicates the amount of a commodity that is required to produce a dollar of
the industry’s output”, BEA
4The other sectors include agriculture, mining, utilities, transport, whole-sale trade, retail trade, infor-
mation and construction.
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(a) Network influence, vi (b) Sectoral GDP ratio, si
Figure 2.1: Network influence and Sectoral GDP ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(intercept)
0.029** 0.033** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025)
ΓNewt
1.887** 2.230** 0.940 1.006*
(0.6728) (0.5971) (0.4798) (0.4867)
ΓNewt−1
2.296** 1.716** 1.500** 1.629**
(0.6730) (0.5941) (0.4787) (0.4981)
ΓNewt−2
1.780** 0.249
(0.5978) (0.4841)
N 63 62 63 62
R2 0.2436 0.3435 0.1632 0.1793
Adj.R2 0.2184 0.3096 0.1354 0.1542
Table 2.1: Explanatory power of new granular residual on GDP growth
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
(intercept)
0.029** 0.033** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0026)
ΓGabaixt
1.995** 2.021** 0.890 1.008*
(0.6736) (0.5502) (0.4938) (0.5001)
ΓGabaixt−1
2.115** 1.292* 1.423* 1.640**
(0.6736) (0.5524) (0.4867) (0.5106)
ΓGabaixt−2
1.561* 0.4075
(0.5523) (0.4891)
N 63 62 63 62
R2 0.2213 0.2859 0.1425 0.1698
Adj.R2 0.1953 0.2490 0.1140 0.1268
Table 2.2: Explanatory power of Gabaix’s granular residual on GDP growth
As Gabaix (2011) mentioned, if aggregate fluctuation were solely driven by economy-wide
shocks, the granular residual should be uncorrelated with growth rate of GDP. Table 1 shows
the results from the regression of GDP growth on the new granular residual. The first two
specifications are the cases where there is no sector shock. The last two specifications are
about the granular residual with industry demeaning. Table 2 shows the result regression of
GDP growth on the granular residual devised by Gabaix (2011).5 As we see, the correlation
between growth and the measure of idiosyncratic shocks is high, which means that the
performance of individual firms, especially large firms, matters.
Overall, the new granular residual explains better than the previous granular residual.
This is the result of the effect of network linkage. The new granular residual without industry
shock explains 34 % of GDP. However, in the presence of sectoral shock, it’s explanatory
power drops down to 18 %, which implies sectoral shock also matters, and sectoral shock
and network-linkages is another interesting topic to think about.
5This result is different from his paper because I calculate average firm productivity from whole population
rather than Top 100 or 1000 firm.
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2.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a monopolistic competition model where there are network linkages
through intermediate inputs. In the presence of monopolistic competition, information of
sales is not sufficient information of individual firm’s impact on economy. Network linkages
are as important as the size of the firm. The measured discrepancy between influence and
sales ratio supports this argument.
The new analysis sheds light on precision of granularity literature. With the measure
driven by model, this paper re-examined the importance of idiosyncratic shock in large firm.
As a result, the modified granular residual explains almost 35 % of aggregate fluctuations
without presence of sectoral shock. However, it decreases to 18 % once these shocks are
considered. Even though it still remains as meaningful correlation, the drop indicates the
importance of sectoral shocks, which might lead us to another interesting topic.
Other extensions could include employing variable mark-up, refining data work and doing
a full variance decomposition analysis to increase precision. Moreover, dynamic variant with
entry and exit might improve our understanding of aggregate fluctuations.
2.5 Appendix
Lemma 1.
W
Π
= α(η − 1)
Proof of lemma 1:
Individual firm’s profit from firm’s optimal solution
piu,i =
1
ηη(η − 1)1−η z
η−1
u,i
(MCi
Pi
)1−η
PiQi
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Therefore, aggregate profit in sector i is simply
pii =
1
ηη(η − 1)1−η
(MCi
Pi
)1−η
PiQi
{∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
}
Finally, aggregate profit in this economy becomes
Π =
1
ηη(η − 1)1−η
S∑
i=1
(MCi
Pi
)1−η
PiQi
{∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
}
On the other hand,
lu,i =
( α
1− α
)1−α( ξi
W
)1−α qu,i
zu,i
=
( α
1− α
)1−α( ξi
W
)1−α(MCi
Pi
)−η( η
η − 1
)−η
zη−1u,i Qi
= α
( η
η − 1
)−η
W−1
(MCi
Pi
)1−η
zη−1u,i PiQi
If we aggregate across varieties and sectors, and further use labor market clearing condition.
W = α
( η
η − 1
)−η S∑
i=1
(MCi
Pi
)1−η
PiQi
{∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
}
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Proposition 1 (Logarithm of real value added)
y = log(C/P ) = v′
where
v′ = αβ′[I − (1− α)Ω]−1, Ω(i,j) = ωij, i = 1
α
log
({∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
} 1
η−1
)
Proof:
Optimal labor equation (11) yields
lu,i =
( α
1− α
)1−α( ξi
W
)1−α qu,i
zu,i
=
( α
1− α
)1−α( ξi
W
)1−α
zη−1u,i
(MCi
Pi
)−η( η
η − 1
)−η
Qi
To simplify, define aggregate intermediate goods which firm u used in sector i
Iu,i ≡
S∏
j=1
X
ωij
u,i,j =
(1− α
α
)α(W
ξi
)α qu,i
zu,i
=
(1− α
α
)α(W
ξi
)α
zη−1u,i
(MCi
Pi
)−η( η
η − 1
)−η
Qi
Plug optimal labor and optimal aggregate intermediate goods he chooses into his production
function.
qu,i = zil
α
u,iI
1−α
u,i = z
η
u,i
(MCi
Pi
)−η( η
η − 1
)−η
Qi
With CES aggregator defined in (2), we can get
Qi =
{∫ 1
0
q
η−1
η
u,i du
} η
η−1 =
{∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
} η
η−1 (MCi
Pi
)−η( η
η − 1
)−η
Qi (2.21)
With definition of marginal cost MCi and equation (21) , we can get wage equation in each
sector i
Wα = αα(1− α)1−αη − 1
η
Piξ
−(1−α)
i
{∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
} 1
η−1
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Take logs on both sides
α log(W ) = α log(α) + (1− α) log(1− α) + log(η − 1
η
) + log(Pi)+
(1− α)
S∑
j=1
ωij log(ωij)− (1− α)
S∑
j=1
ωij log(Pj) + log(
{∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
} 1
η−1
)
(2.22)
By lemma 1,
α log(W + Π) = α log(
1 + α(η − 1)
α(η − 1) W ) = α log(1 + α(η − 1))− α log(α(η − 1)) + α log(W )
Finally, we can get combined household income equation. For any industry i,
α log(W+Π) = B+log(Pi)+(1−α)
S∑
j=1
ωij log(ωij)−(1−α)
S∑
j=1
ωij log(Pj)+log(
{∫ 1
0
zη−1u,i du
} 1
η−1
)
(2.23)
where B = (1− α) log(1− α) + α log(1 + α(η − 1)) + (1− α) log(η − 1)− log(η)
Finally, we can get similar form of Acemoglu et al. (2012). The remainder of the proof
is exactly same as theirs (see Acemoglu et al. (2012)).
Define influence vector v′ = αβ′[I − (1 − α)Ω]−1 where I is S × S identity matrix. Ω
is S × S input requirements matrix. After multiplying each equation by i th element of
influence vector, if we sum over all sectors, it gives
log(W + Π) = v′+ µ
where µ =
∑S
i=1 βi log(Pi) +B/α +
1−α
α
∑S
i=1
∑S
j=1 viωij log(ωij) and  is defined above
Normalize price index (
S∏
i=1
β−βii A
−1)
S∏
i=1
P βii = 1 (i.e P
βi
i = A
S∏
i=1
ββii ).
This makes µ = 0. Finally, we prove that the logarithm of real value added is
log(W + Π) = v′
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Proposition 2.
In the presence of monopolistic competition, firm size is not a sufficient statistic to measure
the individual firm’s impact on economy. That is, there is a discrepancy between influence
vector and sales vector.
v′ = αβ′[I − (1− α)Ω]−1
s′ =
1 + α(η − 1)
η
β′[I − (1− α)η − 1
η
Ω]−1
proof)
In each sector, goods market clearing condition tells us
PiCi +
S∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
PiXu,j,idu = PiQi for ∀i = 1, · · · , S
The representative agent spends β portion of his income to buy i sector goods and an
individual firm spends (1− α)ωji portion of his marginal cost to buy intermediaries.
βi(W + Π) +
S∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
(1− α)ωjiMCj
zu,j
qu,jdu = PiQi
By equation (7) and (10),
βi(W + Π) +
S∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
(1− α)ωjiη − 1
η
p1−ηu,j P
η
j Qjdu = PiQi
βi(W + Π) + (1− α)η − 1
η
S∑
j=1
ωjiPjQjdu = PiQi
Define fi =
PiQi
W+Π
,
β + (1− α)η − 1
η
Ω′f = f
f ′ = β′[I − (1− α)η − 1
η
Ω]−1
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Normalize f ′ so that it’s sum equal to 1. (i.e s′ = 1+α(η−1)
η
f ′ )
Proposition 3 (Decomposition of variance of growth)
Suppose individual firm growth follows the process (14). Further, Gt, git, ek,i,t are indepen-
dent each other. ek,i,t is also independent across firms. Then,
σ2∆(log(yt)) = σ
2
G +
S∑
i=1
v2i σ
2
g,i +
S∑
i=1
Ni∑
k=1
v2i (
Sk,i,t−1
Yi
)2σ2e,k,i (2.24)
where
Sk,i,t−1 : Sales of k firm in sector i at t-1
Yi,t−1 : Aggregate real value added of sector i at t-1
Ni : Number of firm in sector i
v′ = αβ′[I − (1− α)Ω]−1 : Influence vector
σ2∆(log(yt)) : Variance of growth in GDP.
σ2G : Variance of macro shock.
σ2g,i : Variance of sectoral shock.
σ2e,k,i : Variance of k firm’s idiosyncratic shock in sector i.
Proof:
At the finite firm level, the equation (13) becomes
∆ log(yt) =
S∑
i=1
vi log
(
{
Ni∑
k=1
zη−1k,i,t/
Ni∑
k′=1
zη−1k′,i,t−1}
1
η−1
)
=
S∑
i=1
vi
1
η − 1 log
( Ni∑
k=1
zη−1k,i,t−1∑Ni
k′=1 z
η−1
k′,i,t−1
( zk,i,t
zk,i,t−1
)η−1)
Note that
zη−1k,i,t−1
Ni∑
k′=1
zη−1
k′,i,t−1
=
Sk,i,t−1
Yi,t−1
,
Ni∑
k=1
Sk,i,t−1 = Yi,t−1, and
S∑
i=1
vi = 1.
Therefore,
∆ log(yt) =
S∑
i=1
vi
1
η − 1 log
( Ni∑
k=1
Si,k,t−1
Yi
( zk,i,t
zk,i,t−1
)η−1)
=
S∑
i=1
vi
1
η − 1 log
( Ni∑
k=1
Si,k,t−1
Yi
( zk,i,t
zk,i,t−1
)η−1)
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Imposing the shock process (14) gives us
∆ log(yt) = Gt +
S∑
i=1
vigi,t +
S∑
i=1
vi
1
η − 1 log
( Ni∑
k=1
Si,k,t−1
Yi
expek,i(η−1)
))
Take the first Taylor approximation with respect to ek,i
∆ log(yt) = Gt +
S∑
i=1
vigi,t +
S∑
i=1
vi
( Ni∑
k=1
Si,k,t−1
Yi
ek,i
)
+ o(e)
V ar(∆ log(yt)) = σ
2
G +
S∑
i=1
v2i σ
2
g,i +
S∑
i=1
Ni∑
k=1
v2i (
Si,k,t−1
Yi
)2σ2e,k,i
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CHAPTER 3
The Role of Sectoral Linkages in International Trade
3.1 Introduction
From Ricardo’s basic comparative advantage model to more recent rich quantitative analysis,
the trade literature has almost always centered around a common theme: ’Trade improves
our lives.’ However, although a variety of different methods have been proposed, there is
little consensus among trade economists regarding the source and the size of the gains from
trade.
In one of the most comprehensive explorations of the welfare gains from trade, Arkolakis
et al. (2012) inspect gains from trade quantitatively in a wide class of recent trade models.
They demonstrate that welfare gain can be measured by two statistics: the Domestic share
(λ), and the trade elasticity (). Wˆ = λ−1/. Following ACR, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
(2013) empirically measure the welfare gain with various models and market structures.
Without fully specifying the general equilibrium, they provide a method to measure welfare
gain. Quantitatively, estimated welfare gain is small overall, but adding multiple sectors and
tradable intermediate goods allows them to get decent welfare gains from trade.
The role of intermediate goods has also been emphasized by many other papers. In the
macro literature, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2012) analyze asymmetric network structure
and its implications for idiosyncratic shocks. Di Giovanni et al. (2014) apply a similar idea to
French firm level date to give a quantitative assessment of the importance of firm linkages on
aggregate fluctuations. The results from each of these papers suggest that sectoral linkages
can have economically important implications.
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In the international trade literature, earlier work in this area has been done by Balistreri
et al. (2011), who estimate gains from trade with intermediate goods, but without sectoral
linkages. More closely related to this paper, Ossa (2015)incorporates intermediate goods
and sectoral linkages into an Armington model, emphasizing the importance of varying
trade elasticities across sectors. In a similar analysis, Caliendo and Parro (2012) analyze
NAFTA’s tariff reductions using a Ricardian sectoral linkages model. Both of these papers
demonstrate that the connections between different industries can increase the gains from
trade relative to standard formulations.
Based on this literature, I develop a multi-sector model that builds on Melitz (2003)
by adding input-output linkages across sectors. More specifically, I examine the interaction
between tradable goods and non-tradable goods through network linkages. In the model,
these linkages set off a positive chain reaction that amplifies gains from trade.
The model in this paper is different from existing models with input-output linkages in
that it can not only compare welfare gains with standard models, but also enables counter-
factual analysis to examine the importance of network linkages. My results show that the
intermediate goods channel alone cannot generate realistic welfare gains and therefore un-
derstanding the role of sectoral linakages appears to be necessary to fully understand the
dynamics of international trade. Another interesting finding is that higher network depen-
dence on tradable goods can create substantially larger welfare gains. However, dependence
on tradable goods from non-tradable sector is low and a large portion of consumption ex-
penditure (80 % in the U.S) comes from non-tradable goods, which limits the ability of my
model to fully capture the potential gains from trade.
To summarize, the model is the first to include all of the following features simultaneously:
1. Multi-sector model with firm heterogenity in the spirit of Melitz (2003)
2. Input-output linkages
3. Intermediate goods and consumption goods that are both tradable
4. Fully specified general equilibrium analysis
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Combining all of these features provides a closer look at the impact of sectoral linkages
on welfare gain and non-tradable goods, which I believe has not been fully exploited by the
literature to this point.
In section 2, I set up the model incorporating the features mentioned above. The bench-
mark calibration and computational solution procedure will be explained in section 3. Fi-
nally, various counter-factuals and analysis will be conducted in section 4.
3.2 Framework
This paper extends a multi-sector version of Melitz (2003) with network linkages. The
network structure follows Long and Plosser (1983) and Acemoglu et al. (2012). To simplify
the discussion, there are only 2 countries. The foreign version of each variable will be denoted
by a * above the corresponding variable. Although I do not solve the model with more than
two countries, similar logic should apply.
3.2.1 The model
2.1.1. Households. The representative household has Cobb-Douglas preference over S
sector goods and inelastically supplies L units of labor.
U =
S∑
i=1
βilog(Ci) (3.1)
βi is the preference parameter on consumption goods from sector i. The agent maximizes
his utility subject to the following budget constraint
S∑
i=1
PiCi = WL+ Π (3.2)
where Pi is the price index of consumption aggregator i and W is wage. Π is aggregate profit
from domestic monopolistic firms, given by
56
Π =
S∑
i=1
∫
u∈Mi
pii(u) du (3.3)
where Mi indicates the set of domestic firms in sector i.
2.1.2. Composite goods. In each sector, there is a continuum of varieties provided by
monopolistically competitive firms. As in Acemoglu et al. (2012), the composite goods can
either be consumed or used as intermediates to produce a specific variety final good. Each
good follows the standard Dixit and Stiglitz aggregator.
Qi =
[ ∫
u∈Ψi
qi(u)
η−1
η du
] η
η−1 (3.4)
where u is an index for each firm. qi(u) is the quantity of the variety produced by firm, u, η
is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties (same across country and sectors1), and
Ψi is the set of varieties domestic consumer can access in their home market. Subsequently,
the counterpart of this set in a foreign country will be denoted by Ψ∗i .
In the standard model, total expenditure is entirely derived from consumer spending,
which means it is equivalent to real value added. However, in the presence of intermediate
inputs, total expenditure corresponds to gross output, which can be decomposed into con-
sumption and intermediate demand. Given the home gross expenditure of sector i, Ei, the
home expenditure on a variety is given by
pi(u)qi(u) =
(pi(u)
Pi
)1−η
Ei (3.5)
where pi(u) is the price imposed by an individual firm, and the sectoral aggregate price index
is
Pi =
(∫
u∈Ψi
pi(u)
1−ηdu
) 1
1−η
(3.6)
1One might can generalize by allowing substitution parameters to be different across sectors, but it would
affect the Leontief matrix. This will be taken into account in future research
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2.1.3 Firms Following the benchmark model of Gaubert and Itskhoki (2016), I assume there
is an exogeneous mass of firms Mi. Each firm in sector i draws productivity, ϕ from a Pareto
distribution with a lower bound, ϕ
i
, discussed by Chaney (2008) Therefore, the cumulative
distribution of productivity in sector i is given by
Gi(ϕ) = 1−
( ϕ
ϕ
i
)−θ
(3.7)
Also, the technology level of sector i can be summarized by
Ti = Miϕ
θ
i
(3.8)
where θ is the shape parameter of the firm distribution.
Firms are price setters, given demand equation (5). They use labor and intermediate
goods to produce a variety of the final good. Importantly, they need intermediate inputs
not only from their own sector, but also from other sectors, causing input-output linkages.
Therefore, a firm has the following constant return to scale technology.
qi(u) = ϕi(u)li(u)
α
S∏
j=1
xji(u)
ωji(1−α) (3.9)
where li is the amount of labor in firm u, xji(u) is the demand of intermediary j from industry
i, α is the labor share parameter, and ωji shapes the share of sector j good necessary to
produce the efficient unit of sector i good.
In order to operate, each firm is required to pay F units of home labor. Additionally, to
sell their product in the foreign markets, they need to pay F ∗ units of labor to foreign labor
(so the payment goes to foreign workers). Finally, to deliver one unit of their good, they
need to deliver τi units of a good from the domestic port. Therefore, the cost function of
domestic firm endowed with ϕ in sector i can be summarized by
ιi(q) =
mci
ϕ
q +WF, ιexi (q) =
mciτi
ϕ
q +W ∗F ∗ (3.10)
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where
mci =
(W
α
)α
( ξi
1− α
)1−α
(3.11)
ξi =
S∏
j=1
( Pj
ωji
)ωji (3.12)
ιi is the cost to produce q units of domestic goods and ι
ex
i is the cost to produce q units of
foreign goods. Each cost function is active only when a firms operates or when they become
an exporter, respectively. As we can see, mci is the channel through which one sectors
actions can affect other sectors. The standard Melitz (2003) corresponds to the case when α
is equal to 1 (No intermediate inputs needed in production). With the summarized version
of the cost function, the firm’s optimal price to maximize his profit is
pi(u) =
η
η − 1
mci
ϕi(u)
(3.13)
And the optimized profit will be
pii(u) =
[( η
η − 1
)1−η(mci
Pi
)1−η
ϕi(u)
η−1Ei −WF
]+
+
[( η
η − 1
)1−η(mci
Pi
)1−η
ϕi(u)
η−1E∗i −W ∗F ∗
]+ (3.14)
Finally, the input payment follows
Wli(u) = αϕi(u)
η−1( η
η − 1
)−η(mci
Pi
)1−η
Ei (3.15)
Pjxji(u) = (1− α)ωjiϕi(u)η−1
( η
η − 1
)−η(mci
Pi
)1−η
Ei (3.16)
3.2.2 Sectoral Equilibrium
Given the price level, equation (14) determines the cut-off level of the firm in each coun-
try. The sectoral equilibrium has a similar form to standard setups. (see detailed proof in
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Appendix)
Pi =
η
η − 1mci
( θTi
θ − η + 1
)− 1
θ (
1− Φi) 1θ
(ηWF
Ei
) θ−η+1
θ(η−1)
(3.17)
where
Φi =
1
1 +
(
τimc∗i /mci
)θ
Ti/T ∗i
(3.18)
Φi is the foreign share of domestic market.
The interpretation of sectoral price equations is almost the same as usual. High marginal
cost, mci increases overall price index of the composite good. A higher technology level
decreases the price, but this is partially canceled out by the domestic share term 1 − Φi.
The last term
(
ηWF
Ei
)
becomes constant in the standard literature. Here, it depends on the
network linkages, which will be discussed later.
3.2.3 General Equilibrium
To get the general equilibrium conditions, it’s helpful to understand how the firm’s revenue
can be decomposed. With the aggregation of (14) - (16) and cutoff level derived in the
Appendix, we can decompose revenue into several parts. Table 1 shows sector level of firm’s
accounting table
Therefore, the associated sector labor demand equation is
WLi =
(
α
η − 1
η
+
θ − η + 1
ηθ
)
[1− Φi]Ei + θ − η + 1
ηθ
ΦiEi + α
η − 1
η
Φ∗iE
∗
i (3.19)
The first term is labor income, which includes both variable cost and fixed cost for domestic
firms. The second term is the fixed cost payment from foreign firms and the final term is
the wage paid to exporting goods.
The trade balance should satisfy
S∑
i=1
NXi = 0 (3.20)
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Revenue from home market &
foreign market[
1− Φi
]
Ei + Φ
∗
iE
∗
i
Wage payment α(η−1
η
)
([
1− Φi
]
Ei + Φ
∗
iE
∗
i
)
Intermediate payment (1−α)(η−1
η
)
([
1−Φi
]
Ei + Φ
∗
iE
∗
i
)
Entry cost (Home) θ−η+1
θη
(1− Φi)Ei
Entry cost (Foreign) θ−η+1
θη
Φ∗iE
∗
i
Profit
η−1
θη
([
1− Φi
]
Ei + Φ
∗
iE
∗
i
)
Table 3.1: Domestic Firm’s Revenue Split
where NXi = Φ
∗
iE
∗
i − ΦiEi.
Unlike standard models, the expenditure ratio is not equal to a fixed portion of income.
The sectoral expenditure equation follows
Ei = βi(WL+ Π) +
S∑
j=1
PiXij (3.21)
The left hand side indicates gross expenditure in sector i. On the right side, the first term
represents consumer’s spending on good i and the last term indicates the aggregate expen-
diture of sector j on intermediate good i. With equation (20) and (21), sector expenditure
follows
Ei = viE +
S∑
j=1
ΓijNXj (3.22)
ν ≡ 1+α(η−1)
η
[I−(1−α)η−1
η
Ω]−1β and Γ ≡ [I−(1−α)η−1
η
Ω]−1−I where Ω is the input-ouput
matrix whose (i, j) element is ωij.
ν is the inverse of the Leontief matrix used to calculate the input-output network, which
is similar to Acemoglu et al. (2012) (Note that its elements sum to 1). Γ captures the added
effect on network linkages with other sectors that arises when firms begin to export. Under
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the positive net exports of other sectors, the sector’s gross expenditure becomes higher as
linkages become stronger.2
To completely characterize the general equilibrium, a specific form for (3.22) would be
required (see Appendix A).
e = ν +
{
Φ˜∗ + Γ−1 + Φ˜
}−1{
Φ˜∗
W ∗L∗
WL
− Φ˜
}
ν (3.23)
Φ˜ is a foreign share matrix whose ith diagonal element is Φi and every other element 0.
e is an S×1 vector of sector expenditure to gross expenditure ratios. (i.e Ei = eiE).
Clearly, as α goes to 1, it collapses into the standard case, where expenditure is a fixed
fraction βi of total expenditure.
Finally, the sectoral labor supply (3.19) and the trade balance equation (3.20) yields the
labor market clearing condition
WL =
(
α
η − 1
η
+
θ − η + 1
ηθ
)
E (3.24)
which means wage payment is the fixed fraction of aggregate gross output.
3.3 Data and Calibration
The empirical portion of this paper considers the case of the US vs the rest of the world. I
measure and calibrate several parameters to match the foreign share as a benchmark case,
and then do counter-factual analysis to see the network effect on trade.
I use 2015 World Input-Output Data (WIOD) to measure intermediate share ωij for each
sector and country. WIOD includes data for 40 countries and 34 sectors 3. To simplify
2The simple example would be the case when there is only input-output linkage within sector. In this
case, The equation (3.22) becomes Ei =viE + (
η
1+α(η−1) − 1)NXi, which means positive net export sector
has higher gross expenditure share.
3Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security is excluded
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Figure 3.1: Intermediate Share of Each Sector by Country
Note : (i,j) figure means the intermediate share of i sector good in j sector by country ; 1=Tradable Sector
/ 2= Nontradable sector
the analysis, I focus on the interaction between tradable and nontradable goods. In the
Appendix B, there is table 3 that shows the categorization method employed.
Figure 1 shows the intermediate share of a sector i good in j sector by country (The
figure of finer classification is in Appendix B). The x-axis indicates the country index and
the y-axis represents the share of intermediate inputs used to produce the corresponding
goods. For example, the first point in the (1,2) figure means that non-tradable sector in the
1st country spends 20% of its intermediate spending to buy the goods from tradable sector.
Clearly, if ωij is same across country, each figure should exhibit a straight line.
Even though the data doesn’t display a perfectly straight line, the intermediary spending
share is similar across countries.4. Therefore, I will use the U.S as the benchmark case
and assume the rest of world has the same input -output linkage as the model assume. To
calculate gross expenditure ratio by sector, νi, we need personal expenditure ratio, βi, which
comes from BEA industry data.
4Outlier countries are Bulgaria, China, India, Indonesia
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Parameter/variable Value
θ 4.34
η 5.30
α 0.45
τ 1.47
T ∗t 0.08
T ∗nt 0.09
F 4.6 · 10−6
L∗/L 25
ωTT 0.7
ωNN 0.8
w∗/w 4.09
Table 3.2: Benchmark Parameters
Table 2 shows the calibrated benchmark parameters. The elasticity of substitution is
assumed to be 5, which is a commonly used value in the literature. To correspond to Zipf’s
law, the firm heterogeneity parameter, θ is set to 4.34. I adopt the parameter the fixed cost
from Gaubert and Itskhoki (2016). α is chosen to match GDP to gross output ratio in the
U.S. Labor is given by the population ratio of world against the U.S. from the World Bank
data set. Finally, with technology normalized in the home country, the foreign technology
level and trade cost in each sector are calibrated to match the foreign share of the U.S
coming from U.S. International Trade Data of U.S Census Bureau. Finally, ωTT gives the
intermediate share of tradable goods from tradable sector. The solution procedure with
which I estimate trade costs and do counter-factual is given by
Solution Procedure
1. Normalize W as 1 and guess W ∗
2. Given W ∗, solve for price of home and foreign to equate
1) Sectoral equilibrium equation (3.17)
2) Labor market clearing condition equation (3.24)5
3) Expenditure ratio equation (3.23)
5This equation can be directly put into (3.17)
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3. With foreign share driven from the 2nd step procedure, calculate
∑S
i=1 ΦiEi.
4. Update W ∗ until trade balance becomes 0.
3.4 Counterfactuals
In this section, I measure the welfare gain in the benchmark when going from autarky to
free trade. I also measure the welfare gain from various counter-factuals to compare the
standard theory with the benchmark and analyze the role of input-output linkage, especially
the interaction between tradable and non-tradable goods. I also measure the welfare gain
going from autarky to trade at a finer, sector-level analysis. The result is exactly same as
the reported benchmark result. To simplify analysis of linkage network as counterfactuals, I
categorize into just two sectors.
Figure 3.2 illustrates possible network linkages we can use in counter-factual analysis.
The arrow direction shows the flow of consumption or intermediate goods. The first diagram
depicts the features of standard theory, with no channel between different sectors on supply
side. The only way they can interact is through consumers. When it comes to welfare gain,
part of the problem of the standard theory can be traced to this omission. In a partial
equilibrium sense, a favorable environment in one sector is unfavorable to the other sector
because wage payments become more expensive, which canceled the initially large gains from
trade to some extent.
The benchmark diagram adds network linkages. There is not only input-output linkage
within sectors, but also across sectors. On the other hand, in the third diagram, there is no
linkage across sectors as in the standard theory, but firms interact within their own sector.
Finally, the last diagram is when the linkage dependence is biased toward tradable sector
– causing the cascading effect mentioned in Acemoglu et al. (2012). In the paper, they
measures the impact of each industries’ network effect with out-degree defined by
di =
S∑
j=1
ωij (3.25)
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Therefore, the last figure in figure 3.2 is when the tradable good has the highest possible
(out) degrees – higher dependence on tradable goods.
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Benchmark Standard τT=1 τNT = τT
Smallest Largest No Network
Outdegree Outdegree Linkage
PA/P 0.0429 0.0211 0.1768 0.1944 0.0161 0.1213 0.0330
Table 3.3: Welfare Gains from Trade
To begin my analysis of welfare gains from trade, I compare the gains from my model to
the standard model. Figure 3 shows the welfare gain as the trade cost decreases. Clearly,
welfare gain increases as trade costs decreases. Moreover, the presence of network effects
enhances the welfare gains through the linkage channel, which confirms the results of previous
work.
Further, I impose other network structures as a counter-factual analysis to understand
the role of network effects on welfare gains. The last 3 columns of table 3 correspond to this
exercise. ’Largest out-degree’ and ’No network linkage’ are the cases corresponding to the
last 2 diagrams in figure 3.2 as mentioned above. ‘Smallest out-degree’ is the opposite case
of ‘Largest out-degree.’
Clearly, the welfare gain is the biggest when the structure of the economy depends more
on tradable goods. On the other hand, the opposite case is even smaller than the standard
theory. This implies that the presence of intermediate inputs itself is not enough for high
welfare gains. Higher welfare gains should come along together with overall improvement in
the modeling of the non-tradable sector through the network linkages.
A disappointing result is that although the measured data reveals the presence of inter-
action between tradable sectors and non-tradable sectors, it’s not high enough to produce
high welfare gain from trade. (ωNT = 0.2 and ωTN = 0.3) The fourth column of the table
3 shows that the welfare gain becomes high only if the non-tradable sector were to become
tradable. Surprisingly, the welfare gain is even higher in this case than when there is no
trade cost for tradable goods. Therefore, it appears that any further gains will need to come
from improving our understanding of the ways openness can affect the non-tradable sector.
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Figure 3.2: Possible network linkages
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Figure 3.3: Comparison between the Model and the Standard Melitz
3.5 Concluding Remark
This paper develops a multi-sector model based on Melitz (2003) with input-output linkages.
With this framework, we can analyze how firms interact with each other across sectors and
countries. When goods are delivered to other countries, it initiates a positive chain reaction,
increasing the size of welfare gains through the network channel, a feature that is excluded
from many standard models.
The results show a modest improvement in welfare gains from trade. Welfare gains
become larger when there is a linkage channel from tradable to nontradable goods. However,
the results are not as strong as expected due to the relatively small importance of tradable
goods for an economy. To get higher welfare gains, we likely need to consider other channels
to bring about the improvement in non-traded goods as well as tradable goods. Still, sectoral
linkages appear to be a promising path forward and there are probably more indirect ways
in which these linkages affect the production of non-tradable goods in an economy that
opens to trade. Future research should attempt to explore more complicated models that
can incorporate features like allowing for different production and network systems across
countries. Generalizing the model by including CES technology and estimating parameters
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directly could also add precision.
3.6 Appendix. A
3.6.1 Proof of Sectoral Equilibrium
Rewrite the profit equation (14)
pii(u) =
[( η
η − 1
)1−η(mci
Pi
)1−η
ϕi(u)
η−1Ei −WF
]+
+
[( η
η − 1
)1−η(mci
Pi
)1−η
ϕi(u)
η−1E∗i −W ∗F ∗
]+ (3.26)
Together with the foreign counterpart of the equation, we can get cutoff level of operating do-
mestic firm(ϕi,h), exporting domestic firm(ϕi,h), operating foreign firm(ϕ
∗
i,f ), and exporting
foreign firm(ϕ∗i,h), respectively.
ϕi,h =
η
η − 1
mci
Pi
(ηWF
Ei
) 1
η−1
(3.27)
ϕi,f =
η
η − 1
mci
P ∗i
(ηW ∗F ∗
E∗i
) 1
η−1
(3.28)
ϕ∗i,h =
η
η − 1
mc∗i
Pi
(ηWF
Ei
) 1
η−1
(3.29)
ϕ∗i,f =
η
η − 1
mc∗i
P ∗i
(ηW ∗F ∗
E∗i
) 1
η−1
(3.30)
The definition of domestic price index (6) can be decomposed into
Pi =
[ ∫
u∈Mi
pi(u)
1−ηdu+
∫
u∈Mfi
pi(u)
1−ηdu
] 1
1−η
(3.31)
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where Mi is the set of continuing domestic firms and M
f
i is the set of foreign firms to export
to the domestic market. Given exogeneous mass Mi together with cutoff level (3.27)-(3.30)
and a Pareto distribution (3.7),
Pi =
η
η − 1mci(
θTi
θ − η + 1)
1
1−η (ϕi,h)
η−1−θ
1−η
[
1 + (mci/τimc
∗
i )
θT ∗i /Ti
] 1
1−η
(3.32)
Plug this value back into the cutoff level (3.27) - (3.28) and solve for the cutoff level
ϕi,h =
( θTi
θ − η + 1
) 1
θ
(1− Φi)− 1θ
(ηWF
Ei
) 1
θ
(3.33)
ϕi,f =
( θT ∗i
θ − η + 1
) 1
θ
(1− Φ∗i )−
1
θ
(ηW ∗F ∗
E∗i
) 1
θ
(3.34)
ϕ∗i,h =
mci
τimc∗i
ϕi,h (3.35)
Finally combined with the price index (3.32), we can get the desired result (3.17)
Pi =
η
η − 1mci
( θTi
θ − η + 1
)− 1
θ (
1− Φi) 1θ
(ηWF
Ei
) θ−η+1
θ(η−1)
(3.36)
3.6.2 Proof of Sectoral Expenditure Share
Rewrite the gross expenditure equation, (3.21)
Ei = βi(WL+ Π) +
S∑
j=1
PiXij (3.37)
from the value of the table 1, we can see the equation becomes
Ei = βi
1 + α(η − 1)
η
S∑
j=1
((1−Φj)Ej+ΦjE∗j )+(1−α)
η − 1
η
S∑
j=1
ωij((1−Φj)Ej+Φ∗jE∗j ) (3.38)
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Define E such that i th component is Ei and let’s define NXj = Φ
∗
jE
∗
j − ΦjEj Then, the
system of equation becomes6
E = β
1 + α(η − 1)
η
1′E+
1 + α(η − 1)
η
1′NX+(1−α)η − 1
η
ΩE+(1−α)η − 1
η
ΩNX (3.39)
where 1′ is S×1 vector whose all element is 1. Note that by the trade balance equation,
1′NX = 0.
Define e ≡ E/1′E, nx ≡ NX/1′E
e =
1 + α(η − 1)
η
β + (1− α)η − 1
η
Ωe+ (1− α)η − 1
η
Ωnx (3.40)
Therefore,
e =
1 + α(η − 1)
η
[I − (1− α)η − 1
η
Ω]−1β + {[I − (1− α)η − 1
η
Ω]−1 − I}nx (3.41)
Further, define ν ≡ 1+α(η)
η−1 [I − (1− α)η−1η Ω]−1β and Γ ≡ [I − (1− α) ηη−1Ω]−1 − I Then,
e = v + Γnx (3.42)
On the other hand, we can express the net export as the matrix form that follows the next
equation.
NX = Φ˜∗E∗ − Φ˜E (3.43)
where the ith diagonal element of Φ˜ is Φi, elsewhere 0. Therefore,
nx = Φ˜∗e∗
1′E∗
1′E
− Φ˜e (3.44)
6Abusing notation, E is now the vector of expenditure
72
With labor market clearing condition, (3.24), the total expenditure ratio is equal to wage
ratio between 2 country.
1′E∗
1′E
=
W ∗L∗
WL
(3.45)
After some matrix manipulation, equation (3.42), (3.44) and it’s counterpart together with
(3.45) yields.
e = v +
{
I + Γ
[
I + Φ˜∗Γ
]−1
Φ˜
}−1
Γ[I + Φ˜∗Γ
]−1{
Φ˜∗
W ∗L∗
WL
− Φ˜
}
ν (3.46)
Simplifying further,
e = ν +
{
Φ˜∗ + Γ−1 + Φ˜
}−1{
Φ˜∗
W ∗L∗
WL
− Φ˜
}
ν (3.47)
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tabular
3.7 Appendix B
Figure 3.4: Intermediary Share of Each Sector by Country
Note : (i,j) figure means the intermediary share of i sector good in j sector by country x axis indicates the
index of country; The list of industries : ’Agriculture’, ’Mining’, ’Utilities’, ’Construction’, ’Manufacturing’,
’Wholesale - Retail trade’, ’Transportation’, ’Information’, ’Services’
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NAICS WIOD
Tradable
Agriculture Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
Mining Mining and Quarrying
Manufacturing
Food, Beverages and Tobacco
Textiles and Textile Products
Leather, Leather and Footwear
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
Chemicals and Chemical Products
Rubber and Plastics
Other Non-Metallic Mineral
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
Machinery, Nec
Electrical and Optical Equipment
Transport Equipment
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
Non-tradable
Utilities Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction Construction
Wholesale & Retail
Sale, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade
Retail Trade
Transport
Inland Transport
Water Transport
Air Transport
Other transport
Information Post and Telecommunications
Services
Hotels and Restaurants
Financial Intermediation
Real Estate Activities
Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities
Education
Health and Social Work
Other Community, Social and Personal Services
Private Households with Employed Persons
Table 3.4: Industry Classification used in Figure 1 and Figure 3
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Index Number Country’s name WIOD code
1 Australia AUS
2 Austria AUT
3 Belgium Bel
4 Bulgaria BGR
5 Brazil BRA
6 Canada CAN
7 China CHN
8 Cyprus CYP
9 Czech Republic CZE
10 Germany DEU
11 Denmark DNK
12 Spain ESP
13 Estonia EST
14 Finland Fin
15 France FRA
16 United Kingdom GBR
18 Hungary HUN
19 India IDN
20 Indonesia IND
21 Ireland IRL
22 Italy ITA
23 Japan JPN
24 Korea KOR
25 Lithuania LTU
26 Luxembourg LUX
27 Latvia LVA
28 Mexico MEX
29 Malta MLT
30 Netherlands NLD
31 Poland POL
32 Portugal PRT
33 Romania ROM
34 Russia RUS
35 Slovakia SVK
36 Slovenia SVN
37 Sweden SWE
38 Turkey TUR
39 Taiwan TWN
40 United States USA
Table 3.5: Country list
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